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THE BATI'LE OVER IMPLIED
PREEMPTION: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
AND THE FDA
MARYJ. DAvis*

Abstract: A mere five years ago, the Food and Drug Administration (the
"FDA") began, for the first time in its 100-year history, to take the position
that its prescription drug labeling regulations defeated the ability of injured plaintiffs to pursue common law tort claims based on the adequacy
of the labeling. This position, radical to many and rational to others,
places federal preemption of prescription drug labeling actions directly
in the center of the debate over the proper roles of federal regulation
and state tort laws in promoting product safety. The U.S. Supreme Court
has contributed to this debate with several product liability preemption
decisions in the past two decades. Seeking to promote both understanding and balance regarding the operation of preemption doctrine within
products liability, this Article provides a comprehensive explanation of
the applicability of preemption doctrine to prescription drug product liability actions. It explores the history of preemption doctrine as it relates
to the food and drug laws, evaluates the arguments posited in favor of
and against preemption, assesses the FDA's position on the application of
that doctrine to current litigation, and provides direction to courts in defining the boundaries of implied preemption.
INTRODUCTION

Federal preemption of common law tort actions has become the
subject of conspiracy theorists, dedicated tort reformers, and all those
in between.' Described on the one hand as a massive effort at the fed-

* Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. University of Virginia, 1979; J.D. Wake Forest University School of Law, 1985. I would like to
thank the participants at the Randall-Park Colloquium Speakers Series, University of Kentucky College of Law, for their observations on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Professors
Richard Ausness, David Owen, and Joe Page for their helpful insights, and to Tammy
Howard, University of Kentucky College of Law, Class of 2006, for her fine research assistance.
I See Ralph Lindeman, Agencies Move to Override State Law as Part of FederalRulemaking
Process, 34 BNA PRODUCT SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 364, 364 (2006); MARGARET H. CLUNE, CTR.
FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, STEALTH TORT REFORM: How THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
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eral level to chip away at state tort law, 2 and on the other as a good
thing, preferable to standards set by state juries,3 advocates on both
sides of the preemption debate have an opinion about whether federal
regulations should defeat state common law tort actions. 4 The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed preemption of product liability claims on
several occasions since its 1992 decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.,5 which put federal preemption of product liability actions in the
forefront of the debate over the role of federal regulation in effecting
product safety.6 The political dimension of this debate continues, especially in the area of preemption of prescription drug product liability
7
claims.
A mere five years ago, the Food and Drug Administration (the
"FDA")8 for the first time in its 100-year history asserted that its prescription drug labeling regulations preempted injured plaintiffs'
common law tort claims based on the adequacy of the labeling. 9
Common law products liability doctrines typically do not treat federally approved prescription drug labeling as conclusive on the question
of the label's adequacy.10 The classic reasoning underlying this con1-2, 7-9 (2004),
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/preemption.pdtf.
2 Lindeman, supra note 1, at 364 (quoting Susan Frederick, Senior Director with the
National Conference of State Legislatures); id. (federal agency statements favoring preemption are a "sneak attack on consumer rights"); see also CLUNE, supra note 1, at 1 (describing new FDA position on preemption as "anti-consumer tort reform agenda").
3 Lindeman, supra note 1, at 364 (quoting David Price, Senior Counsel with the Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative legal reform group).
4 For a discussion of the general debate on preemption by agency action, see generally
Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort
Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 227 (2007), and Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, BackdoorFederalization,53 UCLA L. REv. 1353 (2006).
r 505 U.S. 504, 518-19 (1992) (involving express preemption of product liability actions by federal cigarette labeling laws).
6 See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 443-54 (2005); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-70 (2002); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S.
341, 347-53 (2000); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867-86 (1999); MedIronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-91 (1996).
7 Compare CLUNE, supra note 1, at 1 (describing new FDA position on preemption as
.anti-consumer tort reform agenda"), with News Release, Wash. Legal Found., WLF Hails
FDA Policy Statement on Preemption of Failure-to-Warn Suits (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/012506RS.pdf (lauding the position, having "call[ed] on FDA
to issue such a policy statement for several years").
8 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2000) (authorizing the creation of the Food and Drug Administration as the agency responsible for administering the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
9 See Mary Ellen Egan, Tort Turf FORBES, Apr. 26, 2004, at 48.
10 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 16 cmts. b, e (Proposed Final Draft May 17, 2005) (noting that the lawmaking process is "insufficiently attenAGGRESSIVE USE OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE HURTS CONSUMERS
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clusion is that governmental regulations are based on narrowly defined goals, supported by limited information provided substantially
by the regulated entity, and typically do not include setting optimal
standards of care for all circumstances; rather, they set minimum
standards not intended to prevent the operation of other remedial
mechanisms such as common law tort claims.1' Consequently, more
exacting state tort law standards of care do not conflict, but operate
2
concurrently with the federal requirements.'

tive" to interests of injured and that an "unusual situation" arises when governmental
compliance is treated as conclusive of due care); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 4(b) (1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965). See generally DAN B.
LAW
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 224 (2000); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILIT

§ 14.3, at 888 (2005) [hereinafter OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY]; see also DAVID G. OWEN,
M. STUART MADDEN & MARYJ. DAVIS, MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16:3,

at 134 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY].
For a discussion of the doctrine as applied to products liability actions, see generally
Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REv.
1210 (1996); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the
Right Balance Between the Two, 30 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 431 (1997); Teresa Moran Schwartz,
The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1121
(1988); and Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products Liability, 88 GEO. LJ.
2049 (2000).
On the subject of regulatory compliance regarding prescription drugs, see generally
David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, RationalizingProduct Liability for PrescriptionDrugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform PharmaceuticalSafety Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 395 (1996) (advocating a regulatory compliance defense for
pharmaceuticals); and Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 335 (1985) ("Regulatory agencies are
equipped to make the risk comparisons on which all progressive transformation of the risk
environment must be based. The courts are simply not qualified to second-guess such decisions; when they choose to do so they routinely make regressive risk choices.").
"See DOBBS, supra note 10, § 224, at 573. Dan Dobbs notes:
When it comes to technological standards, they are quickly outdated with no
guarantee that the legislature or regulators will have time or information
necessary to update them. Beyond that, many statutes are written in response
to lobbying efforts of the industry they purport to regulate, and they are not
likely to represent a balanced attempt by neutral parties to achieve appropriate safety.
Id. Some states statutorily provide a regulatory compliance defense. See, e.g., COLO. REv.
STAT. § 13-21-403(1) (2005) (regulatory compliance presumes due care); IND. CODE § 3420-5-1 (1998) (same); MICH. CoMp. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 1995) (immunity on
drug manufacturers based on federal regulatory compliance). See generally OWEN, PRODucTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 14.3, at 894 ("About a dozen states have enacted products
liability reform statutes concerning the effect of a manufacturer's compliance with a governmental safety standard.").
12 Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989); Wells v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 746 (11th Cir. 1986); Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730
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When state laws, including tort claims, do conflict with federal
regulation, they are preempted under authority of the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 8 The key to establishing preemption is
a finding of congressional intent to preempt, called "the ultimate
touchstone" of preemption analysis.' 4 Congress may evidence this intent by including in a law an express preemption provision, which must
be analyzed to determine the extent of that intent.1 5 When Congress
does not include such a provision, implied preemption doctrines operate. 16 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the "FDCA")17 does
not contain a generally applicable express preemption provision.' 8
Consequently, implied preemption doctrines apply.19
The FDA's recent position favoring preemption-that its labeling
regulations establish optimal standards in some cases from which state
law may not deviate 2 0-places federal preemption of prescription
(D. Minn. 2005); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825, 828 (D.C. 1994); see
also MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 28:6, at 909-13.
IS U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("The Constitution, and laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ). On
the application of preemption to tort laws, see generally Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of
Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000); BetsyJ. Grey, The New FederalismJurisprudenceand National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 475, 503-10 (2002); Alexander I. Haas, Chipping
Away at State Tort Remedies Through PreemptionJurisprudence:Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co., 89 CAL. L. REv. 1927 (2001); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 290-91
(2000); and Symposium, FederalPreemption of State Tort Law: The Problem of MedicalDrugs and
Devices, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 1 (2005).
14 Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
15 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. See generally Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption
Against Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REv. 967 (2002) (explaining history of preemption doctrine).
16 See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. at 867-68 (express preemption provision not exclusive in determining scope of preemption; implied preemption of claims based on failure to include
driver's side air bags).
17 21 U.S.C.A §§ 301-397 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
18 See Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1035 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (explaining that portion of FDCA dealing with pharmaceuticals does not contain preemption
provision); McCallister v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 164 F. Supp. 2d 783, 792 (S.D. W. Va. 2001)
(same); Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/S, 2002 WL 181972, at *2 (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 28, 2002) (same); see also Geiger & Rosen, supra note 10, at 400 (noting there is
no express preemption provision in prescription drug labeling sections of FDCA); James T.
O'Reilly, A State ofExtinction: Does Food and DrugAdministrationApproval of a PrescriptionDrug
Label Extinguish State Claimsfor Inadequate Warning?, 58 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 287, 290 (2003)
(same).
19 See Geiger & Rosen, supra note 10, at 400.
20 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601). The prescription drug labeling regulation became final and
effective on June 30, 2006. Id. at 3928. The regulation is discussed in detail in Part III, infra
notes 149-348.
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drug labeling actions directly in the center of the debate over the
proper role of federal regulation in effecting product safety. 21 Seeking
to promote both an understanding of and a balance in the operation
of preemption doctrine within products liability, this Article provides
a comprehensive explanation of the applicability of preemption doctrine to prescription drug product liability actions. 22 The Article explores the relevance of the FDA's changed position on that doctrine
and provides direction to courts charged with defining the boundaries of implied preemption in this critical area.2 3
Part I presents background on the recent cases that raise the preemption issue. 24 Part II examines in greater detail the regulatory
scheme under the FDCA, placing the preemption issue in context. 25
Part III explores the evolution of implied preemption doctrine generally and then applies that understanding to food and drug regulation. 26 Part IV analyzes critically the basis for implied conflict preemption under the FDCA and evaluates those arguments in a manner
consistent with a deeper understanding of the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence.2 7 In doing so, Part IV addresses the effect the
FDA's recent change in position has on implied preemption analysis. 28
The proper weight of an agency's determination of preemptive
scope has generated much debate within the Supreme Court 29 and
among commentators.3 0 The Court has not answered the question of
how an agency position affects the operation of implied conflict pre21 For two recent articles on this debate, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA
Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1J. TORT L., art. 5 (2006); and Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law
Meets the Administrative State, 1J. TORT L., art. 4 (2006).
22 See infra notes 32-469 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 32-469 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 32-61 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 62-148 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 149-348 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 349-457 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 349-457 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 474-514 (Justices Stevens, Breyer, and O'Connor disagreed about level of deference to FDA's preemption position regarding medical device
regulations).
30 See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, "After You, My DearAlphonse!": Should the Courts Defer to
the FDA's New Interpretationof § 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments?, 80 TuL. L. REV.
727, 767-75 (2006); Allison M. Zieve & Brian Wolfman, The FDA's Argument for Eradicating
State Tort Law: Why It Is Wrong and Warrants No Deferenc 34 BNA PRODUCT SAFETY & LIAB.
REP. 308, 308 (2006). See generally Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron ?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 823 (1995); Nina A.
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MicH. L. REv. 737 (2004).
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emption doctrine, nor has it addressed how the historic primacy of
state regulation in the area of health and safety is to be considered in
the balance. Part IV evaluates the Court's modern preemption jurisprudence and concludes that it does not support implied conflict
preemption of prescription drug labeling products liability actions. 31
An agency attempting to alter the long-standing, historic balance between federal safety regulation and common law tort principles and to
establish actual conflict with underlying tort principles must justify its
position with something more than evolving notions of valid scientific
inquiry and shifting political positions. Traditional tort law continues
to play an important role in providing compensation for injured consumers, and the Supreme Court's preemption doctrine requires much
more than an agency's change of heart to alter that conclusion. The
boundary between state tort law and federal regulation of prescription drug labeling continues to be well-marked, preserving the traditional place for the operation of state tort law.
I.

SETTING THE STAGE FOR PREEMPTION

Before 2002, the FDA maintained the position that its product ap-

proval process and state tort liability usually operate independentlyeach providing a significant, yet distinct, layer of consumer protec-

tion. 32 In 2002, the FDA announced a significant shift in its position,

31See infra notes 349-457 and accompanying text.
32 Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 57 FooD &
DRUG L.J. 7, 11 (1997) (Ms. Porter was FDA Chief Counsel at the time of the article's publication); see also Foreign Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66378, 66384 (Nov. 28, 2003) (to be codified
at 48 C.F.R. pt. 5125) ("FDA's regulations establish the minimal standards necessary, but
were not intended to preclude the States from imposing additional labeling requirements."). See generally O'Reilly, supra note 18, at 288 ("Until DHHS [Department of Health
& Human Services] asserted prescription drug preemption in (Motus v. Pfizer, Inc.], FDA
had remained aloof from preemption arguments that often had been made by prescription drug manufacturers in defense of individual products liability lawsuits."). A few
months before the Motus brief, the FDA took a similar preemption position in another
products liability action which was ultimately decided on other grounds. See Bernhardt v.
Pfizer, Inc., 00 Civ. 4042 (LMM), 00 Civ. 4379 (LMM), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16963, at *910 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 16, 2002).
At the time of the United States's Motus Amicus Brief, the FDA's General Counsel and
architect of the changed preemption position, Daniel Troy, had formerly represented
Pfizer, Inc. during his time in private practice. Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Preempt Tort
Suits: Does It Close Off Vital DrugData?, 26 NAT'L L.J, Mar. 1, 2004, at 1. Troy has been criticized for not disclosing his Pfizer ties. House Cuts OC's Funds for Downplaying Troy's Drug
Industry Ties, FDA WK.,July 16, 2004, § 29; see also O'Reilly, supra note 18, at 287 (discussing
FDA change in position regarding preemption); CLUNE, supra note 1, at 2-3 (describing
FDA change in position under Troy).
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one aggressively in favor of preemption, based on concerns over "the
growing propensity of bad scientific reasoning to seep into court cases
involving FDA-regulated products. " 33 Prescription drug manufacturers,
with support from the FDA in the form of amicus briefs, began to take
the litigation position that approved prescription drug labeling preempts state tort claims. 34 Proponents of the continuing vitality of traditional tort doctrine, however, argue that it establishes a duty of care,
protecting citizens in circumstances where the federal government is
late in acting or where federal standards are insufficient.3 5 Reasoning
that common law tort claims are a critical component of the states' traditional ability to protect the health and safety of their citizens, one
court has noted that "[t] he power of states to govern in this field is considerable and undisputed."36

An example of the tension between these two positions is illustrated by Motus v. Pfize, Inc., a 2004 case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in which the FDA first asserted its new propreemption position. 37 Plaintiff alleged that the warnings on the anti33 Egan, supra note 9; see also Lindeman, supra note 1, at 365 (quoting one White
House Office of Management and Budget spokesman as saying, "State courts and juries
often lack the information, expertise, and staff that the federal agencies rely upon in performing their scientific, risk-based calculation").
34 See, e.g., Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 688 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(denying motion to dismiss on implied preemption of Elidel warning claims); Jackson v.
Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 969 (D. Neb. 2006) (denying motion to dismiss on implied preemption grounds in Zoloft case); Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514,
555 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (granting motion to dismiss on FDA's implied preemption of plaintiff's warning claims regarding antidepressant Paxil and risk of suicide), appeal docketed, No.
06-3107 (3d Cir. June 21, 2006); Laisure-Radke v. Par Pharm., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1163,
1174 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (denying summary judgment based on implied preemption in
antidepressant fluoxetine case); Peters v. Astrazeneca, LP, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058
(W.D. Wis. 2006) (no implied preemption in Prilosec warning case); McNellis v. Pfizer,
Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286JBS, 2005 WL 3752269, at *12-13 (D.NJ. Dec. 29, 2005) (no implied
preemption in Zoloft case); Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732 (D. Minn.
2005) (denying summary judgment based on preemption argument in Zoloft case); Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-3074-N, 2004 WL 1773697, at *6 (N.D. Tex., Aug.
6, 2004) (granting summary judgment for manufacturer based on conflict preemption in
Zoloft case); Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-02-3559, 2004 WL 2191804, at *10 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 20, 2004) (same); see also CLUNE, supra note 1, at 2-3.
35 Letter from Sen. Steven J. Rauschenberger, President of Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures, to Mike Leavitt, Sec'y of U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Jan. 13, 2006)
[hereinafter Letter to Mike Leavitt], available at http://ncs.org/statefed/FDArule.htm.
36 Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
37 See generally 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004), rev g 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
The FDA's new position was first expressed in an amicus brief submitted to the Ninth Circuit.
See generallyBrief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant, Motus,
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depressant Zoloft, a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor ("SSRI"),
were inadequate under state product liability laws because they did not
emphasize sufficiently the association between use of the drug and an
increased risk of suicide.3 8 Prior to and during the course of approving
Zoloft in 1991, the FDA explored the potential associations between
the use of SSRIs and suicide.3 9 Concerns caused the FDA to convene a
committee of experts, the Psycho-pharmacological Drugs Advisory
Committee (the "PDAC"), to consider the issue. 40 In 1991, the PDAC
unanimously found that there was no credible evidence to support a
conclusion that the antidepressant drugs cause the emergence and/or
intensification of suicidality and/or other violent behaviors. 41 The FDA
subsequently made suggestions to Pfizer regarding warning language it
should incorporate in Zoloft labeling and convinced Pfizer to use the
42
proposed text verbatim.
Pfizer moved for summary judgment before the district court in
Motus based on implied conflict preemption, arguing that to permit
liability based on state tort laws would defeat the objectives of the
regulatory scheme because federal regulators had decided, based on
the available scientific evidence, that an additional warning was not
required. 43 The court denied the motion, finding that the federal
regulation which permits a manufacturer to alter a warning without
prior FDA approval prevented any conflict with state product liability
laws. 44 The trial court was persuaded by the FDA Commissioner's previous statements favoring the role of unilateral manufacturer labeling
changes to increase information provided to health care providers
and enhance public safety.45 In addition, the trial court noted that,
358 F.3d 659 (No. 02-55372), 2002 WL 32303084 [hereinafter Motus Amicus Brief of United
States].
38 Motus, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1087-90 (discussing regulatory history of Zoloft and other
similar antidepressants known as SSRIs).
39 Id. at 1090. Suicidality and the use of SSRIs had been studied earlier in connection
with the drug Prozac. Id.
40 Id. at 1088, 1090.
41 Id. at 1090. During the PDAC proceedings, the Director of the Division stated a concern that an unintended side effect of modifying the labeling to raise an increased concern over suicidality "might be a reduction in the use of antidepressants in the treatment
of depression, and that the result might cause overall injury to the public health." Id.
42 Id. at 1088. Plaintiff contended that Pfizer drafted the ultimately approved labeling
language, not the FDA. Id. at n.3.
43 Motus, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. Pfizer also argued for implied conflict preemption
based on the impossibility of being able to comply with both the federal and state requirements. Id. at 1092.
4Id.
at 1094 (referring to 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2007)).
45Id. The FDA Commissioner had stated, in support of the then-current regulation:
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although the FDA concluded that no labeling change was required
based on its review of the scientific evidence, the FDA never stated
46
that it would be impermissible to include additional warnings.
In support of Pfizer's appeal of the denial of summary judgment,
the FDA argued that although FDA regulations permit a drug's manufacturer to alter or strengthen a warning, it is the FDA, not each state
court system applying its own standards, that must approve the warning. 47 The FDA disagreed with the suggestion that, to constitute an

actual conflict for preemption purposes, the FDA must reject a proposed warning change formally because all imaginable warnings that
could reasonably have been read as describing or alluding to the association with suicidality would have been false or misleading for lack of
scientific support and therefore in conflict with federal law.48 The
FDA concluded that any state common law damages action that resulted in requiring an unapproved warning would have misbranded
the drug per se, thereby subjecting the manufacturer to penalties un-

The commissioner also advises that these labeling requirements do not prohibit a manufacturer ... from warning health care professionals whenever
possibly harmful adverse effects associated with the use of the drug are discovered. The addition to labeling ...

of additional warnings ...

is not prohib-

ited by these regulations .... In the case of an approved NDA, 314.8(d) [now
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2) (i)] permits the addition to the drug's labeling ... of
information about a hazard without advance approval by the FDA.
Id. (citing 21 Fed. Reg. 37,447 (1979)).
46 Id. at 1095. After an ensuing three years of debate regarding whether to strengthen

the antidepressant labeling, the FDA required manufacturers to place a stronger warning,
known as a "black box" warning, on the labeling, highlighting the potential association
between the drugs and the risk of suicide. Public Health Advisory, FDA, Worsening Depression and Suicidality in Patients Being Treated with Antidepressant (Mar. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/AntidepressantsPHA.hin (recommending labeling for antidepressants like Zoloft be modified to reflect potential suicide risks); Press Release, FDA, FDA Launches a Multi-Pronged Strategy to Strengthen
Safeguards for Children Treated with Antidepressant Medications (Oct. 14, 2004), available
at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01124.html
(black box warning required on SSRIs). The British equivalent of the FDA recommended a similar warning as
early as 2002, before the FDA's pro-preemption position was made known. See Brief for
Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 6, Motus, 358 F.3d 659
(No. 02-55372), 2003 WL 22716063 [hereinafter Motus Amicus Brief of Public Citizen]. In
May 2007, the FDA asked makers of the drugs to expand the warning labels yet again, to
include risks of suicide to eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds. Andrew Bridges, FDA Warns of
Suicide Risks Linked to Drug,Assoc. PRESS, May 3, 2007 (on file with the Boston College Law
Review), available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/bclawreview/PastjIssues.
html.
47 Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra note 37, at 13.
48 Id. at 14.
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der the FDCA. 49 Notably, however, the FDA must make a determination that a drug is misbranded and then seek injunctive relief from a
federal district court before a final determination on misbranding
results in the assessment of penalties. 50
A number of subsequent cases have addressed this specific issue.5'
In Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., a 2006 case in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the plaintiffs made similar
claims regarding the failure to warn of increased risk of suicidality on
labeling for Paxil, another SSRI, manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline
and Apotex. 52 Defendants moved for summary judgment on the same
bases as had Pfizer in Motus. Unlike Pfizer, however, the Colacicco defendants were successful, in large part because the trial court deferred
to the FDA's position in favor of preemption.5 3 An increasing number
of prescription drug labeling cases have been defended successfully on
54
similar grounds.
Most cases, however, have denied preemption. 55 For example, Perry
v. Novartis Pharma. Corp., another 2006 case from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, concluded that the
federal law did not preempt the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claims because
a state law requirement to provide an additional warning would not
force the drug company to choose between violating federal or state
law.56 The court noted that no federal law prevented the manufacturer
from adding a warning of increased cancer risk to children who used
49 Id. at 16.
50 21 U.S.C. § 332 (2000); see also Motus Amicus Brief of Public Citizen, supra note 46,
at 16 (arguing that threat of enforcement action not enough to create a conflict; filing of
enforcement does not guarantee that the FDA will prevail). The manufacturer is entided
to a jury trial of the issue. 21 U.S.C. § 332(b).
"' See, e.g., Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 525-35.
52 Id. at 519-20.
53 Id. at 525-35.
54 Needleman, 2004 WL 1773697, at *5 (Zoloft warning litigation); Dusek, 2004 WL
2191804, at *10 (Zoloft warning litigation); Abramowitz v. Cephalon, Inc., 2006 WL
560639, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 3, 2006) (Actiq warning litigation).
55 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657, 2007 WL 1952964, at *10 (E.D. La.
July 3, 2007); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d. 230, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007);
Perry, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 688; Laisure-Radke, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (Prozac warning
litigation);Jackson, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (Zoloft warning litigation); Peters, 417 F. Supp. 2d
at 1058 (Prilosec warning litigation); Witczak, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 732 (Zoloft warning litigation); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1044 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (Parlodel lactation suppressant warning litigation); Coutu v. Tracy, No. CA PC/00-3720, 2006
WL 1314261, at *4 (R-I. Super. May 11, 2006) (Propofol coma-inducing drug warning litigation).
56 456 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
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Elidel, an eczema treatment.5 7 The court recognized that state law tort
lawsuits provide an important backstop to the federal regulatory
scheme.58 In addition, the court was persuaded by the absence of an
FDA rejection of the particular warning the plaintiffs sought, as well as
the ability of manufacturers to modify their labeling without FDA ap59
proval.
. When it applies, federal preemption doctrine acts like a "super"
government compliance defense because it permits complete displacement of state law by the federal regulation. Because implied conflict
preemption doctrine requires an assessment of federal regulatory objectives to determine whether an actual conflict exists with the operation of
applicable state laws, 60 an understanding of the regulatory scheme for
prescription drug labeling and the objectives served is critical, and is the
subject of the next Part.
II.

61

LABELING REGULATIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL
FOOD AND DRUG LAWS

This Part examines in greater detail the regulatory scheme under
the FDCA, providing context for the preemption debate. 62 It begins
by describing the labeling requirements of the federal food and drug
laws and then exploring how drug labeling is created, approved, and
modified. 63 Finally, it details the FDA's new regulation for drug label64
ing and its proposed preemptive effect.
A. Requirements of the FederalFood and DrugLaws
Federal regulation of food and drugs occurred as early as the midnineteenth century but began in earnest in 1906 with the enactment of

57 Id.
58Id. at 687.
59
Id. at 686. The court also noted that other methods were available for manufacturers
to use to communicate increased risks, in addition to the federally approved labeling, that
would not be subject to preemption analysis. Id.
60 Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1985)
(discussing implied preemption requirements); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947) (discussing assessment of federal objectives in implied preemption inquiry). See generally Davis, supra note 15, at 969-71, 990-97 (discussing implied conflict
preemption).
61 See infra notes 62-148 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 65-148 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 65-111 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 112-148 and accompanying text.
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the Pure Food and Drug Act. 65 The 1906 Act was prompted by con-

cerns raised by state food and drug regulators over adulterated and
misbranded food products moving in interstate commerce and contaminating the food and drug supply.66 The states had regulated.the
safety of food and drugs since the earliest days of the United States's
history.67 State regulators encouraged, indeed implored, 68 the national
government to create a federal agency to aid in regulation because of
concerns over the states' inability to reach the interstate sale of fraudu69
lent products and, thus, to protect consumers from them.

The modern version of the federal food and drug regulatory
scheme dates from the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938.70 Congress adopted the 1938 Act to protect the public health by enforcing
certain standards of purity and effectiveness, and also to prevent the
sale of misbranded or adulterated products. 71 The 1938 legislation
extended control over more products and enlarged and stiffened the
penalties for disobedience. 72 In 1962, Congress passed the KefauverHarris Amendments to add the requirement of drug efficacy, mandate greater safety, and introduce a rigorous new drug approval process. 73 Several amendments to the 1938 Act over the ensuing years have
6

For a history of the early regulation of food and drugs in the United States, see 1

JAMES T. O'REILLY, FoOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

66Id.§ 3:2.
67

2

O'REILLY, supranote 65,

§§ 3:1-:4 (2d ed. 2005).

§ 25:1.

68 See C. C. Regier, The Struggle for FederalFood and Drugs Legislation, 1 LAW & CONTIMP.

PROBS. 3 (1933); see also 2 O'RErILY, supra note 65, § 25:1. For additional discussion of the
history of the FDCA, see FDA History, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history- and Milestones in
U.S. Food and Drug Law History, http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html.
69 See 2 O'REiLLY, supra note 65, at § 25:1 (overview of relationship between the FDA
and state governments).
70 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.CA §§ 301-397 (West 1999 & Supp.
2007).
7" Id. § 331 (describing prohibited acts of adulteration and misbranding). See generally
United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (discussing purposes of FDCA); United
States v Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914) (discussing similar purposes of
predecessor Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906); United States v. Diapulse Corp., 457 F.2d 25
(2d Cir. 1972) (discussing purposes of Act to prevent adulterated and misbranded food
and drugs); Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Food & Drug Admin., 484 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Del. 1980)
(same); Michelle Meadows, PromotingSafe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, FDA CONSUMER,
Jan./Feb. 2006, availableat http://www.fda.go/fdac/features/2006/106_cder.html.
72 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282 (1943); Research Labs. v. United
States, 167 F.2d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 1948).
73 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to FDCA, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962); see
Meadows, supra note 71, at 1 ("Before marketing a drug, firms now had to prove not only
safety, but also provide substantial evidence of effectiveness for the product's intended
use.... Also critically, the 1962 amendments required that the FDA specifically approve
the marketing application before the drug could be marketed, another major change.").
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added to the complexity of the regulatory scheme and heightened
74
the FDA's ability to achieve its public safety goals.

The key protection against the marketing of ineffective or unsafe
prescription pharmaceutical products comes from the New Drug Approval process, which a company must complete before it can market a
drug. 75 Once a drug is approved and on the market, fewer regulations
exist to enable the FDA to follow the experience of an approved drug's
users. An office responsible for policing the postmarketing safety of
prescription drugs, the Drug Safety Oversight Board (the "DSOB"), was
created in 2005, in part as a result of the perceived lack of action by the
FDA in response to information regarding an increased risk of serious
side effects in those using the osteoarthritis drug Vioxx. 76 The U.S. GovFor a discussion of drug efficacy requirements, see generally Anita Bernstein & Joseph
Bernstein, An Information PrescriptionforDrug Regulation, 54 BUFF. L. Rv. 569 (2006).
74 See, e.g., Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-28, tit. 2, § 201, 118 Stat. 891, 905; Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No.
107-109, § 1, 115 Stat. 1408, 1408 (2002); Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 1 (a), 108 Stat. 4325, 4325; Nutrition Labeling and Education Act Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-80, § 1, 107 Stat. 773, 773; Medical Device
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 1 (a), 90 Stat. 539, 539.
75 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000 & Supp. 11 2003) (new drug application requirements); see
also Applications for FDA Approval to Market New Drugs, 21 C.F.R. pt. 314 (regulations for.
new drug approval applications). The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (the
"CDER") is the office primarily responsible for evaluating new drug approval applications
and is the self-described "consumer watchdog for the roughly 11,000 drugs on the market." Meadows, supra note 71, at 1. Within the CDER, an Office for New Drug Approval
oversees the process. For an explanation of the organization of the CDER and the Office
of New Drugs, see FDA, Ctr for Drug Evaluation and Research, Office of New Drugs Reoganization (June 22, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/cderorg/ond-reorg.htm. For an
explanation of the application process see FDA, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Drug Approval Application Process (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/
applications/default.htm. Stories about the expense of the drug application process are
legendary and are the backdrop to many calls for reform of the process. See, e.g., Clifton
Leaf, How Our National Obsession with Drug Safety Is Killing People-And What We Can Do
About It, FORTUNE, Feb. 20, 2006, at 107.
76
See Press Release, FDA, FDA Statement on Vioxx and Recent Allegations and the
Agency's Continued Commitment to Sound Science and Peer Review (Nov. 14, 2004),
available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01136.html. See generally EnsuringDrug Safety: Where Do We Go from Here?: Hearing on Examining the Food and Drug Administration'sProcess of Ensuring DrugSafety Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter EnsuingDrugSafety]; FDA's DrugApproval Process Up
to the Challenge?: Hearingon Examining Food and DrugAdministration's (FDA) Drug Approval
Process, Focusingon FDA's DrugApproval ProcessAfter a SponsorDemonstrates That Their Beneits
Outweigh Their Risks for a Specific Population and Use, and That the Drug Meets Standardsfor
Safety and Efficacy Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005);
Press Release, FDA, FDA Improvements in Drug Safety Monitoring (Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/factsheets/drugsafety.html (explaining that the "emboldened vision" of the FDA includes that the DSOB will oversee management of drug safety
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ernment Accountability Office (the "GAO") recently criticized the
DSOB as being underfunded, understaffed, and lacking a clear and
effective method to decide whether and how to act when it finds that a
77
drug is unsafe.
If a prescription drug manufacturer fails to comply with any applicable regulation, the approved prescription drug may be considered
misbranded or adulterated under the FDCA. 78 Penalties for selling an
adulterated or misbranded drug or device may be assessed against the
seller, 79 and include the seizure of noncompliant products8° and injunctive relief.8 1 The FDA must have sufficient information on which to
base an action for misbranding. Manufacturers are not required to re82
port the results of the postmarketing clinical trials.
To be misbranded, a regulated product's labeling must be false or
misleading in any particular.83 Proper labeling includes certain identifying information, such as the name and place of business of the manufacturer, and prominent placement of information on the label to ensure readability. 84 Most importantly, proper labeling includes adequate
directions for use, adequate warnings against dangerous use, and sufficient warnings against unsafe dosage. 85
issues and provide emerging information to health providers and patients about the risks
and benefits of medicines).
77 GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA's POST-MARKETING DE(2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT, DRUG

CISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 1, 6

SAFETY], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf. The GAO Report, prepared at the request of Congress, states: "The FDA lacks clear and effective processes for
making decisions about providing management oversight of post-marketing safety issues."
Id. at 5. The GAO Report concluded that the FDA needed increased legal authority to
require post-marketing clinical trials to obtain risk information, describing "serious limitations in the data" that currently support post-marketing safety initiatives. " Id. at 36. Congress recently enacted the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, in part "to enhance the postmarket authorities of the FDA
with respect to the safety of drugs." Title IX, section 901, authorizes the FDA to require
postmarket studies in some cases. Id. § 901.
78 21 U.S.C. § 351 (2000) (adulterated drugs and devices defined); 21 U.S.CA § 352
(West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (misbranded drugs and devices defined).
79 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2000 & Supp. II 2003).
- Id. § 334.
81 Id. § 332.
82 Leaf, supra note 75, at 120 ("PhRMA, the industry's powerful trade group, continues
to fight the idea of mandatory reporting, but promises that its member companies will
offer more data voluntarily.").
83 21 U.S.C. § 352(a).
m Id. § 352(b), (c). FDA-approved labeling is defined generally at 28 U.S.C. § 321 (in).
Proper labeling also includes the established name of the drug and information on the
proportion of active ingredients and their established names, if any. Id. § 352 (e).
Id. § 352(f).
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This labeling is directed at health care practitioners because prescription drugs require professional supervision by a practitioner licensed to administer such drugs. 86 A physician acts as the "learned intermediary" between the manufacturer and the patient-the patient is
intended to use and benefit from the drug but needs a physician to assess the risk and possible benefit of the product for the patient's condition.8 7 Tort liability for prescription drugs is based primarily on allegations that the labeling contains inadequate warnings of risk or improper
use resulting in insufficient advice to the prescribing physician about
the potential harms of the drug. 88 The next Section explores how such
warnings are created, approved, and modified through the FDA's labeling approval process.89
B. PrescriptionDrugLabelingRegulations
A number of sources are available for physicians to access information about the prescription drugs they may consider for treatment of
their patients' medical conditions. 90 A drug's "labeling" is one of these
sources. It refers to the set of documents from the manufacturer that
accompany the drug when given to the prescribing physician and the
- Id. § 353(b).

§ 22:8-:11, at 564-77.
For criticism of the learned intermediary doctrine as it applies to widely advertised prescription drugs, see generally Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245 (NJ. 1999) (rejecting
learned intermediary doctrine in case of direct to consumer advertised contraceptive device); and Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort
LiabilityforPrescriptionDrugManufacturers?,37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 97 (2002).
88 See MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILrry, supra note 10, § 22:9, :10; see also
87 MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10,

Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying learned intermediary doctrine).
Liability for the defective design or formula of a prescription drug is not the subject of
this Article. That topic is covered extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1965).
For a discussion of liability for defective drug design, see generally Brown v. Superior
Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability ., 109 YALE L.J. 1087 (2000); and James A. Henderson
& Aaron D. Twerski, DrugDesignsAre Different, 111 YALE LJ. 151 (2000).
89 See infra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
90 For example, the Physician's Desk Reference, or PDR, is a compilation of the labeling inserts that accompany prescription drugs for easy physician access. As Madden and
Owen explain, "The PDR is an annual publication, a compendium of information about
all ethical drugs, which reproduces the information from the package inserts of all of
them. The PDR is found in the offices of most United States physicians." MADDEN AND
OWEN ON PRODUCTS LiABn rrv, supra note 10, § 22:11, at 574-76; see also Thompson
Healthcare, PDRInet, http://www.PDR.net (last visited Oct. 9, 2007) (online version of the
PDR).
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end user.9 1 The FDA does not create the labeling, but it must ensure
that the statutorily required information is adequately communicated
to those users. Pursuant to the New Drug Approval regulations, the
FDA approves proposed labeling provided to it by the manufacturer
after review of the manufacturer's application. 92 The FDA adopted a
number of regulations to accomplish this task.93
The FDA labeling regulations include general requirements on the
content and format of labeling for prescription drugs. 94 The regulations also contain more specific requirements detailing what is to be
included in the required labeling. 95 The specific requirements identify
the data that the manufacturer must include, the order in which it
must be included, and the indication and usage information that the
manufacturer must provide. 96 The labeling regulations state that manufacturers must describe serious adverse reactions and potential safety
hazards. 97 New drug applications are required to contain copies of the
labeling proposed by manufacturers 98 as well as a summary of the contents of that labeling. 99
The FDA has described this labeling formation process as follows:
FDA's decision as to appropriate labeling is based on the evidence submitted by the applicant, as well as on the agency's
review of other relevant information. Commonly, a drug
manufacturer and FDA will discuss in detail the proposed
drug labeling, including the various warnings to be placed on
the product. Based on the known scientific evidence, appropriate warnings are drafted to express the known risks, while

91 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2000 & Supp. I1 2003); see also 1 O'R mLY, supra note 65,
§ 15:9.
92 21 U.S.C. § 355 (defining application requirements for new drug approvals); see also
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201,
314, 601) ("A prescription drug product's FDA-approved labeling ... is a compilation of
information about the product, approved by the FDA, based on the agency's thorough
analysis of the new drug application (NDA) ... submitted by the applicant.").
93 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.56-.57 (2007).
94 Id. § 201.56.
95 Id. § 201.57.
96 Id. § 201.57(a), (b), (c), (d).
97 Id. § 201.57(e), (f).
98 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(e) (2) (ii).
99 Id. § 314.50(c) (2) (i).
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avoiding the statement of unsubstantiated risks that may unnecessarily deter use of the drug.100
Per this description, the labeling formulation process is one of giveand-take with oversight by the FDA.
Postapproval changes to labeling are permitted under certain circumstances. 10 1 Manufacturers may make unilateral labeling changes
without prior FDA approval to include a warning as soon as there is
reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug; a
causal relationship need not be proved. 10 2 The FDA need not approve
such labeling before the manufacturer implements it under this regulation, but the manufacturer must submit a supplemental application,
called a Supplemental Submission for Changes Being Effected, to effect the change. 0 3 Such a unilateral labeling change has been called a
"safety valve" because it encourages the addition of new warnings when
severe risks not anticipated when the drug was originally approved become known.

04

The FDA must ultimately approve

the labeling

change, 10 5

but the regulation was promulgated to allow drug-makers to
strengthen label warnings quickly when evidence of new side-effects is
discovered. 0 6 Nevertheless, manufacturers commonly do not implement labeling changes without FDA approval. 10 7 Typically, the FDA and

100Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra note 37, at 5.
10121 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) ("Major" labeling changes require prior FDA approval; "major" changes include changes in the drug's formulation that affect its substance).
102 Id. § 201.80(e). This section of the regulation also provides the FDA with authority
to require a "prominently displayed box" with particularly important warning or risk information whose location is specified by the FDA. Id. This is known as a "black box warning."
103 Id. § 314.70(c) (6) (iii) (A); see also Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 729
(D. Minn. 2005) (discussing the process and effect of a Supplemental Submission for
Changes Being Effected application).
104 O'Reilly, supra note 18, at 293-94 ("FDA's regulations and policies encourage
prompt action by the drug companies to improve their warnings when the data justifies
such enhancements."); see also Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 859-60 (4th Cir.
1980).
105 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (6) (iii).
106 Witczak, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 729 (citing 30 Fed. Reg. 993 (Jan. 30, 1965) and 44 Fed.

Reg. 37,447 (June 26, 1979)); see also Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d
1018, 1033-34 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (discussing manufacturer's ability to supplement warnings
under FDA regulations).
107 See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) (discussion of labeling procedures in comments to new labeling regulation); see also Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra note 37, at 17 (discussing ultimate FDA approval required for all labeling changes).
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the manufacturer negotiate about any contemplated labeling change
prior to implementation.10 8
In the preamble to its new labeling regulation, the FDA takes the
position that most approved labeling preempts state common law tort
actions, despite the manufacturer's obligation to alter labeling when
additional safety information is acquired. °9 The manufacturer, therefore, is not placed in the position of having to change labeling in response to possible tort liability, but instead may rest on prior FDA approval of labeling." 0 This new regulation and its attempt to affect
preemption doctrine are discussed in the next Sections."'
C. New Regulation on Labelingfor PrescriptionDrugs
In 2006, the FDA issued a regulation that alters the requirements
for the labeling of prescription drugs and is intended to make that la112
beling more clear, concise, and usable for physicians and patients.
The 2006 regulation introduces three changes: it (1) introduces a
"Highlights" section to labeling, which will provide immediate access to
a drug's most commonly referenced material;" 3 (2) reorders and reor14
ganizes the contents of labeling, introducing graphical requirements;
and (3) makes warning and adverse reaction information more accessible. 115 The regulation applies to new drugs and those approved after
2001.116

108

See GAO REPORT, DRUG SAFETY, supra note 77, at 10.
109Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934-35.
110Id. at 3935.
1 See infra notes 112-148 and accompanying text.
112 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3922; see also Press Release, FDA, FDA Announces Final
Rule on the Requirements for Prescribing Information for Drug and Biological Products
(Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/physlabel/summary.pdf.
The labeling regulation change was prompted by "an increase in the length, detail, and
complexity of prescription drug labeling, making it harder for health care practitioners to
find specific information and to discern the most critical information." Requirements on
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71
Fed. Reg. at 3922.
113 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3923.
114 Id.
115Id.

116 Id. at 3925. To assist manufacturers in complying with the new regulation, the FDA
has produced four guidance documents in addition to the almost 200-page regulation with
comments. Id. at 3929. Guidance documents are authorized to provide additional informa-
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The regulation lists the general categories of information to be
placed into the new "Highlights" section including "Boxed Warning,"
"Recent Major Changes," "Indications and Usage," "Contraindications,"
and "Warnings and Precautions." 1 7 The drug manufacturer chooses
the information to be included in each section, including the "Warning
and Precautions" section.1 1 8 The regulation instructs that "judgment
will continue to be necessary" in deciding which information must be
emphasized. 19
Physicians and health care practitioners expressed unequivocal
enthusiasm for the "Highlights" section, whereas manufacturers were
either opposed or strongly opposed to it.120 Manufacturer opposition

was based, in part, on the obligation to choose what important warnings or other information to include and what information to omit; an
incorrect choice might cause the labeling to be misleading.' 2' Consistent with its predecessor, the new regulation requires manufacturers to
revise labeling unilaterally to include warnings about clinically significant hazards as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with the drug. 122 This language is slightly more rigorous than its
tion to regulated industries about compliance with FDA regulations and to inform the
general public about FDA actions. 21 U.S.C. § 371 (h) (1) (2000).
117 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3924.
118Id. at 3930. FDA's guidance document on "Warnings and Precautions," intended to
assist manufacturers with how to determine the contents of that section, states that it does
not establish legally enforceable responsibilities. See FDA, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, Guidance for Industry- Warnings and Precautions, Contraindications, and Boxed
Warnings Sections of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological ProductsContent and Format (Jan. 18 2006), http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/5538dft.htm ("Instead, guidances describe the Agency's current thinking on a topic and should be viewed
only as recommendations, unless specific regulatory or statutory requirements are cited.").
119 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3932.
120 Id. at 3930.
121Id. Several comments suggested more specific criteria were needed to enable manufacturers to choose consistently the appropriate information to be included in the "Highlights" section. Id. at 3932. Manufacturers also expressed concern about potential competitive disadvantages that might result. Id. The FDA, acknowledging the concerns, suggested
that it is "essential for FDA to review and approve most proposed changes to the information in Highlights" and consequently is revising its regulations on supplementing approvals. Id. The FDA is revising 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (6) (iii), the "safety valve" mentioned earlier, supra notes 103-104, which permits a manufacturer to alter a label to introduce
important safety information. Id.
122 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a) (5) (2007) ("In accordance with § 314.70... the labeling must
be revised to include a warning about a clinically significant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with a drug; a causal relationship need not have
been definitely established.").
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predecessor in that it requires evidence of a clinically significant hazard
connected with a drug before changing approved labeling, though a
causal relationship still is not required. 123 Manufacturers continue to
have permission to add risk information to the Full Prescribing Infor24
mation without first obtaining FDA approval.
Manufacturers maintain discretion under the new regulation to
choose what to say in drug labeling and how to say it with FDA oversight, as before. 125 Perhaps it is this necessary exercise of manufacturer
discretion that prompted the FDA to include a section in the preamble
26
about the product liability implications of the proposed rule.1
D. ProposedPreemptive Effect of the New Labeling Regulation
The FDA favored the concurrent operation of state tort law for
almost the entire first century of its existence based on its inability to
anticipate every way a consumer could be injured by the products it
regulated and on the lack of a federal remedy to provide redress for
injured consumers.1 27 In the preamble to the new labeling regulation,
however, the FDA now argues that product liability lawsuits have directly threatened the agency's ability to regulate manufacturer dissemi128
nation of risk information for prescription drugs.
123 For a discussion of former labeling regulation, see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
124 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934, 3969.
125 Id. at 3930, 3932.
126 Id. at 3933.
127 Motus Amicus Brief of Public Citizen, supra note 46, at 12. The Public Citizen Litiga-

tion Group argued that:
when Congress was considering legislation that ultimately was enacted as the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, it made its intentions clear. Congress
specifically rejected a proposal to include a private right of action for damages caused by faulty or unsafe products regulated under the Act on the
ground that such a right of action already existed under state common law.
Id. (citing Hearings Before Subcomm. of Comm. 'on Commerce on S. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
400, 403 (1933)); see also Borden Co. v. Liddy, 200 F. Supp. 221, 225 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (explaining that federal food labeling regulations provided a minimum level of safety that
could be supplemented by more stringent state regulations).
128 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934. The FDA cites three cases in support of this
proposition. Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare found conflict preemption
based on a FDA warning on nicotine replacement therapy drugs despite a savings clause in
the statute specifically protecting the state requirement. 83 P.3d 1, 15 (Cal. 2004). Motus v.
Pfizer Inc. was resolved in favor of the manufacturer on causation. 358 F.3d 659, 661 (9th
Cir. 2004). In re Paxil Products Liability Litigation is an ongoing multidistrict litigation con-
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The FDA has explicitly called for preemption before, in implementing the Medical Device Amendments (the "MDA") of 1976 to the
FDCA, 129 but Congress included an express preemption provision in
the MDA that delegated authority to the FDA to assess the preemptive
effect that its regulations would have on state laws. 130 By contrast, the
FDA does not have express authority to preempt regarding prescription
drug labeling, and the agency specifically did not address preemption
in the proposed new drug labeling regulation.' 3' Rather, the original
commentary to the regulation specifically stated that it did not preempt
state law and that, therefore, it did not implicate federalism concerns. 132 The final regulation also does not contain a preemption provi133
sion, but rather discusses preemption in the "preamble" section.
That discussion endorses the litigation positions taken in Motus and
other cases 134 and suggests that preemption of state tort law is the FDA's
"long standing view" on preemption. 3 5 That description is at odds with
136
prior statements of the FDA.
The regulation's preamble, which is in essence an advisory opinion, 3 7 argues that state law tort actions may frustrate the agency's imsolidated proceeding. 296 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2003). None of these three
cases would seem to give cause for alarm.
1- 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000) (express preemption provision of Medical Device Amendments of 1976); 21 C.F.R. § 808.1-.5 (2007) (regulations implementing preemption provision). For a discussion of preemption under the Medical Device Amendments, see infra
notes 236-263 and accompanying text.
Iso 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a); see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1996) (discussing FDA regulation implementing preemption provision of MDA).
131See Catherine Hollingsworth & Dana A. Elfin, FDA Revises Labeling Formatfor Drugs,
34 BNA PRODS. SAFETY & LiAB. REP. 52, 52 (2006).
132 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs
and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082,
81,103 (Dec. 22, 2000) (explaining that labeling rule does not have federalism implications nor does it preempt state law, preemption assessment required by Exec. Order No.
13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999)).
133 See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3969.
134 Id. at 3934 ('In order to more fully address the comments expressing concern
about the product liability implications of revising the labeling for prescription drugs, we
believe it would be useful to set forth in some detail the arguments made in those amicus
briefs.").
135 Id.
136 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The National Conference on State Legis-

latures has expressed opposition "to the inclusion of language that would preempt state
product liability laws" in the final regulation and to the process by which the preemption
language was included. See Letter to Mike Leavitt, supra note 35.
137 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d) (1) (2007); see also Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 456 F. Supp.
2d 678, 683-84 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (discussing effect of preamble).
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plementation of federal objectives.13 8 The FDA disagrees with the assertion-widely made-that its labeling requirements are minimum
safety standards and describes that characterization as a misunderstanding of the Act.13 9 The FDA takes the position that its regulations
can establish both a floor and a ceiling.140 Such circumstances include
when additional labeling requirements may not be more protective of
patients, but rather "erode and disrupt the careful and truthful representation of benefits and risks that prescribers need to make appropriate judgments about drug use." 141 The FDA expresses concern that
"[e]xaggeration of risk could discourage appropriate use of a benefi14 2
cial drug" and thus cause over-warning.
After articulating the arguments in favor of preemption, the FDA
identifies those claims that its new labeling regulation would impliedly
preempt. 4 3 It seeks to codify its position in Motus that if a label were
proposed to the FDA and ultimately not required by the time the
plaintiff claims it should have been, the plaintiffs claim based on a
failure to warn is preempted.1 44 The FDA acknowledges that some
state common law damages actions will not be preempted.14 5 It does
138 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934.
139Id. at 3934-35.
140 Id. at 3935. As will be seen infra notes 278-295 and accompanying text, this argument appears derived from the Supreme Court's recent implied preemption case, Geier v.
Ameican Honda Motor Co., which found a motor vehicle safety standard to be both a floor
and a ceiling and thus preemptive of state common law damages actions. 529 U.S. 861, 868
(2000).
141Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935. To illustrate the over-warning concern, the
preamble uses a case in which a state court found federal preemption of an inconsistent
state regulation, not a product liability action. Id. Ironically, the over-warning concern was
raised in Motus and other Zoloft cases in support of preemption, but ultimately the FDA
required a stronger warning of the heightened risk of suicidality, which it had earlier rejected. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
142 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935; see also Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d
163, 178 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing over-warning concern in context of medical device
preemption).
143 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935-36. It protects manufacturers for the discretionary choices they make about what to include in the new "Highlights" section of the
regulation. Id.
144Id.
145 Id. at 3936 (explaining that state common law damages actions based on parallel

state requirements will not be preempted). In addition, in a recent amicus brief in Perry v.
Novartis PharmaceuticalsCorp., the FDA acknowledged that it does not assert that any failure-to-warn claim premised on a manufacturer's failure to provide a warning not con-
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not address, however, the potentially complementary way in which
common law damages actions may operate concurrently with FDA
regulations by permitting compensation for injury and thereby creating an additional incentive for public safety.146
The FDA claims that existing preemption principles support its
preemption position.1 47 The FDA appears to be attempting to alter its
historic position against preemption and apply its new position retroactively. To assess the effect of such an attempt requires a thorough understanding of preemption doctrine, which is explored in the next Part. 148

m.

PREEMPTION UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUG LAWS

This Part explores the of evolution of express and implied preemption doctrine. 149 It then distills from the case law principles important in understanding preemption of food and drug regulation. 5 0
A. Early PreemptionDoctrine Under the Food and DrugLaws
Shortly after enactment of the first federal food and drug law in
1906,151 questions arose regarding how much state authority it displaced. In 1912, in one of the earliest preemption cases, Savage v.Jones,
the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a state law
permitting additional regulation was preempted, even though the fed152
eral legislation arguably did not apply to the food additive at issue.
The Court noted that Congress did not expressly declare its intention
to prevent the states from regulating within the subject of food and
drugs. 153 The Court then described the applicable implied preemption
inquiry:
tained in the drug's approved labeling is preempted. Amicus Curiae Letter Brief of FDA to
Judge Stewart Dalzell at 10-11, Perry, 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (No. CIVA 05-5350) (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 21, 2006).
146 See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935.
147 Id. at 3935-36.
148 See infra notes 149-348 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 151-339 and accompanying text.
1-o See infra notes 340-348 and accompanying text.
151 Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-385, 34 Stat. 768, (repealed
1938).
152 225 U.S. 501, 509 (1912). The seller of the food additive claimed that it was marketed as an herbal treatment for animals, not as feed, and consequently escaped federal
regulations. Id. at 511. Further, because Congress had regulated in the field, the seller
argued that the states were entirely foreclosed from regulating. Id. at 512.
15s Id. at 533.
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If the purpose of the [federal] act cannot otherwise be accomplished-if its operation within its chosen field else must
be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect-the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress
within the sphere of its delegated power.
But the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its
police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact the Congress
has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a
limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied
unless the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual con154
flict with the law of the state.
The Court concluded that the state statute was not impliedly preempted because of two corollary principles the Court articulated: (1)
Congress's implied purpose to preempt must be clearly manifested,
and (2) the repugnance or conflict between the congressional purpose
and the state regulation must be "direct and positive" such that the two
acts could not be reconciled.1 55 The state statute was found not to be in
actual conflict with the federal regulation because it did not impose
conflicting standards nor oppose federal authority-rather, it added
56
consistent, but more rigorous, regulation.
Savage was decided decades before the onslaught of postDepression-era economic regulation and post-World-War-Il civil rights
and other public interest legislation. 157 Preemption doctrine was in its
infancy. Nevertheless, Savage is an important foundational case because
it articulated a rigorous implied conflict preemption analysis in an early
food and drug labeling matter. 158 Indeed, the Court continues to refer
154

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

155 Id. at 537. The Court relied for support on a case holding that a state statutory ac-

tion for civil damages for transporting diseased cattle was not preempted by a federal statute regulating the animal industry because there was no obstruction of the purposes of
Congress by permitting the states to impose civil damages. Id. at 536-37. The Court stated:
May not these statutory provisions stand without obstructing or embarrassing
the execution of the act of congress? This question must of course be determined with reference to the settled rule that a statute enacted in execution of
a reserved power of the state is not to be regarded as inconsistent with an act
of congress ... unless the repugnance or conflict is so direct and positive that
the two acts cannot be reconciled or stand together.
Id. at 535 (quoting Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 624 (1898)).
56
1 Id. at 539.
157 Savage, 225 U.S. at 501.
158 Id. at 535-37.
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to Savage's implied conflict preemption analysis, suggesting its continu159
ing influence.
Building on its discussion of implied preemption in Savage, the
Court, in 1913, decided McDermott v. Wisconsin, in which it found a
160
state food labeling statute impliedly preempted for two reasons.
First, the Wisconsin statute required the defendant food-seller to remove a complying federal label to satisfy the state statute, rendering
the product misbranded under federal law. 161 Second, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture had decided that the defendant's label was satisfactory, permitting the conclusion that compliance with the state law
would render the product misbranded under federal law.162 The Court
concluded that the state's attempt to regulate exclusively was an improper interference with Congress's authority. 163 The Court, conceding the state's authority to regulate consistent with federal law, concluded that the state could not destroy rights arising out of the federal
statute nor impair the effect of a federal law.164 The impossibility of
165
dual compliance required defeat of the state law.
Thus, Savage and McDermott contain the seeds of the implied conflict preemption doctrine the Court applies today.166 Unlike those cases,
however, preemption doctrine during the years between the early twentieth century and the mid-twentieth century is generally marked by a
more generous attitude toward state regulation. 167 During this time, the
168
Supreme Court defined implied preemption doctrine more clearly.
Between the 1940s and 1980s, implied preemption doctrine coalesced

159 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (explaining that
foreign affairs power and the congressional Burma Act impliedly preempted Massachusetts's Burma law); see also Davis, supra note 15, at 1012 (noting the re-emergence of Savage
in Court's modern preemption cases).
160 McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 133 (1913).
16 11d. The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture had concluded that the defendant's corn syrup
label was in compliance with the federal statute's misbranding provision. Id. at 127.
162 Id. at 133.
163 Id. at 134.
164Id. at 133-34.
'6 McDermott, 228 U.S. at 133-24. The "impossibility" category of implied preemption,
thus, has its roots in cases like McDermott. See id. The Court has rarely found true impossibility, however. See, e.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963) (discussing implied preemption involving impossibility); see also Davis, supra note
15, at 984-85.
166See McDermott, 228 U.S. 133-34; Savage, 225 U.S at 533.
167Davis, supra note 15, at 974-78.
168Id.
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into the now-standard categories of occupation of the field preemp1 70
tion1 69 and conflict preemption.
Conflict preemption occurs primarily when the state law "stands
as an obstacle" to the accomplishment of federal objectives and,
therefore, must yield. 7 1 An early example is the Supreme Court's
1942 decision Cloverleaf Butter v. Patterson, in which Alabama officials
seized substantial quantities of packing stock butter, claiming violation
of state safety regulations, when the Federal Department of Agriculture would not have permitted seizure. 172 The Court, relying on Sav73
age and McDermott, concluded that the Alabama law was preempted.
The Court stated that for implied preemption to occur, "it must be
clear that the federal provisions are inconsistent with those of the
state to justify thwarting the state regulation." 74 Recognizing that the
line distinguishing cases of inconsistency was narrow, the Court found
the case to be more like McDermott, in which the state law prohibited
what the federal law permitted. 75 The Court distinguished Savage because the state law at issue in that case merely required additional disclosures that the federal law neither required nor prohibited. 76 In
Savage, federal law was agnostic on the value of the state regulation; in
McDermott and CloverleafButter, federal and state law appeared to op177
erate in opposite directions.
Direct,positive, actual, clear these words describe a substantial showing of conflict that must be made before implied preemption operates
based on the Court's early cases. 178 As applied, the Court's finding of
implied conflict preemption in Cloverleaf Butter seemed based on a

169 Occupation of the field preemption occurs where Congress's legislation is so comprehensive that it occupies the entire field, displacing all state law. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 74 (1941) (finding that the Alien Registration Act of 1940 occupied the field of
foreign affairs and national treatment of aliens and was intended to be exclusive). The
Court has rejected occupation of the field preemption under the FDCA. Hillsborough
County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1985).
170 See Davis, supra note 15, at 983-90.
171 See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947); Hines, 312 U.S. at 67-68.
1- 315 U.S. 148, 150-51, 165-66 (1942).
173 Id. at 158-59, 169.
174 Id. at 156.
175 See id. at 158-59.
176 Id.
177 Cloverleaf,315 U.S. at 158-59.
178 Id. at 156; Savage, 225 U.S. at 533, 537.
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minimal conflict 79 and may reflect an intent to minimize clashes between regulating authorities to free young regulated industries from
inconsistencies.180 By contrast, the dissenting opinion in CloverleafButter
emphasized due regard for the maintenance of our dual system of government, which:
demands that the courts do not diminish state power by extravagant inferences regarding what Congress might have intended if it had considered the matter, or by reference to
their own conceptions of a policy which Congress has not expressed and is not plainly to be inferred from the legislation
8
which it has enacted.' '
Sixty years later, similar arguments continue to be made on both sides
of the preemption debate.
B. Modern Implied Preemption Cases
The Supreme Court did not address another FDCA preemption
case until 1985, in Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc.182 The Court did, however, decide a number of implied preemption cases in the intervening years that are worth noting. 18 In 1959, in
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, the Court was faced for the
first time with an argument for implied preemption of state common
law damages actions. 84 In this case the question was whether the National Labor Relations Act preempted state tort actions-by employers
85
allegedly injured in the course of peaceful picketing by labor activists.
The Court spoke of the difficulty of ascertaining congressional intent
when the enacting Congress, writing twenty-five years earlier, could not
have foreseen the conflicts that would eventually arise.'8 6 In finding
implied preemption based on a conflict with federal legislative objectives, the Court relied on two considerations: (1) the case involved na179See 315 U.S. at 172-73 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that there was a "complete want of conflict between the two statutes," and that the state statute "aids and supplements the federal regulation and policy").
180 See id. at 167-69 (majority opinion).
181 Id. at 177 (Stone, CJ., dissenting).
182 471 U.S. at 707.
183 See generally Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
184 359 U.S. at 237-39.
185 Id. at 241-45 (describing NLRA, as amended by the Labor Management Relations

Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (2000)).
186 Id. at 239-40.
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tional labor policy, about which Congress had legislated "with broad
strokes," 187 and (2) state regulation can be exerted through common
law damages actions as effectively as through more direct regulatory
means18 8 To this day, the Court continues to refer to Garmon for these
propositions. 189 These two fundamental features of implied preemption
analysis, defining the federal objectives with which state law arguably
conflicts and assessing the regulatory nature of common law damages
actions, are central to implied preemption analysis under the FDCA. 190
In the 1980s, the Court again addressed the impact of common
law damages actions on implied preemption analysis. In its 1984 opinion in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., the Court was called upon to determine whether the Atomic Energy Act (the "AEA"), 191 which regulated
the nuclear energy industry, permitted state common law damages actions as a means of concurrent state regulation. 192 The AEA gave states
limited regulatory authority, which they had never had before. 193 The
states were precluded, however, from regulating the safety aspects of
nuclear material. 194 Thus, the preemption provision of the AEA carved
out of federal dominion some small state regulatory authority.195
The Supreme Court concluded unanimously that the AEA did not
preempt the plaintiffs compensatory damages action. 196 The Court,
after reviewing the legislative history and other congressional actions
regarding the AEA, 197 found it difficult to believe that Congress would,
without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those in187Id. at
188

240.

Id. at 246-47. For a more complete discussion of the importance of Garmon, see

Davis, supra note 15, at 981-83.
189See Davis, supra note 15, at 981-83, 1000.
190 See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 240, 246-47.
19142 U.S.C.A §§ 2011-2297h-13 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007). The AEA is administered
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, formerly the Atomic Energy Commission. See id. at
§ 2073 (defining NRC authority). The AEA was enacted in 1954 to free the nuclear energy
industry from total federal control and to provide for private involvement. Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2011-2284).
192 464 U.S. at 241. Karen Silkwood's estate alleged contamination with plutonium
through irregularities at the Kerr-McGee Corp. nuclear power plant where she worked and
sought personal injury and punitive damages under negligence and strict liability doctrines. Id. at 243.
193 See generally Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Con-an'n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983).
1- 42 U.S.C.A § 2021 (c) (4).
195 See id.
196

Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255-56. A majority of the Court held that the AEA similarly did
not preempt the plaintiffs punitive damages claim. Id.
197 Id. at 249-55.
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jured by illegal conduct. 98 The Court recognized that common law
damages actions have regulatory effect, but considered them consistent
with federal objectives in the absence of clear congressional intent to
prohibit them. 199 Recent decisions confirm the regulatory and reme20 0
dial importance of common law damages actions.
One year after Silkwood, the Court addressed a preemption challenge under the FDCA, though not one involving the regulatory effect of common law damages actions. 2 1 In Hillsborough County, a Florida county sought to regulate the collection of blood plasma from
paid donors by requiring further limitations in addition to those required under federal regulations. 20 2 The defendant blood plasma center argued for preemption under both occupation of the field and
conflict preemption. 20 3 The Supreme Court disagreed on both issues
20 4
and reversed an appellate court finding of preemption.
The Court noted that the defendant "faces an uphill battle" in arguing for implied preemption.20 5 The hurdles to preemption fell into
two categories: (1) prior agency position against preemption; 206 and (2)
the presumption that state or local regulation of matters related to
20 7
health and safety can constitutionally coexist with federal regulation.
These two impediments to preemption are central to the issue preemption in the drug labeling context and, therefore, must be fully understood.
The Court stated that the prior FDA position against preemption
was dispositive on the question of implicit intent to preempt unless
either the agency's position was inconsistent with clearly expressed
198Id. at 251. The Court stated:
Indeed, there is no indication that Congress even seriously considered precluding the use of such remedies either when it enacted the Atomic Energy
Act in 1954 or when it amended it in 1959. This silence takes on added significance in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured by such conduct.
Id.
199Id. at 256.
200 See Davis, supra note 15, at 1001, 1013-14 (discussing the post-Silkwood treatment of
common law damages actions in preemption analysis).
20' HillsboroughCounty, 471 U.S. at 709.
202 Id. at 709-10.
203 Id. at 714-16.
204 Id. at 716.
205 Id. at 714. Preliminarily, the Court confirmed that preemption of local ordinances
is analyzed in the same way as the preemption of statewide laws. Id. at 714 n.1.
206 Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714.
207 Id. at 715.
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congressional intent, or subsequent developments revealed a change
in that position. 208 The FDA's position against preemption had been
made clear in commentary to the blood collection regulations 2°9 and
even though the regulations had since been broadened, the FDA had
not indicated that the new regulations affected its disavowal of any
intent to preempt.2 10 The Court thus rejected occupation of the field
preemption even though the regulations were comprehensive, 21 1 noting that "merely because the federal provisions were sufficiently comprehensive to meet the need identified by Congress did not mean that
States and localities were barred from identifying additional needs or
imposing further requirements in the field," 212 consistent with the his213
toric primacy of state regulation in matters of health and safety.

The Court's discussion of field preemption and the importance
of the FDA's position against preemption also informed its rejection
of implied conflict preemption. 214 The defendant had argued that the
local ordinances embodied more stringent requirements than the
federal law and, therefore, presented a serious obstacle to the federal
goal of ensuring an adequate supply of plasma. 215 The Court found
this concern to be too speculative to support preemption. 216 First,
there was little evidence in the record to support the factual assertion
of increased costs from the local regulations or the effect they would
have on blood plasma collection.2 17 Second, even if there had been
evidence of increased costs to plasma collection operators and an in208 Id. at 714-15 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
209 Id. at 714.
210 Id. at 716-17. The Court states:

Thus, if an agency does not speak to the question of preemption, we will
pause before saying that the mere volume and complexity of its regulations
indicate that the agency did in fact intend to preempt .... [W]e will seldom
infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to
preempt in its entirety a field related to health and safety.
Id. at 718.

211 HillsboroughCounty,

471 U.S. at 716.
Id. at 717. The Court was "even more reluctant" to infer field preemption from
regulations than from statutes, saying, "To infer preemption whenever an agency deals
with a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal
agency decides to step into a field, its regulations will be exclusive." Id.
213 Id. at 719. Prior field preemption cases had involved a "special feature" supporting
preemption-the foreign affairs power. Id. (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 62).
214 Id. at 720.
212

215 Id.

216
217

Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 720.
Id. at 720-21.
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creased burden on donors imposed under the local regulation, they
did not necessarily interfere with the federal goal of maintaining an
adequate plasma supply.21 8 According to the Court, neither Congress
219
nor the FDA had struck a balance between safety and quantity;

rather, the regulations that contemplated additional state and local
220
requirements merely established minimum safety standards.
Finally, the Court noted that the FDA could promulgate preemption regulations with relative ease, but it had not done so. 22 1 The
Court attached significance to the absence of either an FDA position
or formal regulation on preemption and, without such strong evidence, was reluctant to find a threat to the federal goal of ensuring
sufficient plasma. 222 Because Congress had delegated to the FDA administration of the federal program, the Court was strongly influenced by the FDA's position as reflected in the prior regulatory commentary and the FDA's silence on the matter in the case before it.223
In summary, until the late 1980s, the Court found preemption
under the FDCA only in two narrow cases, both essentially involving
impossibility. 22 4 Those cases arguably now rest on shaky ground because of the increasingly narrow definition of actual conflict the
Court began to use in subsequent years.2 25 The Court certainly was
influenced by the importance of historic state regulation in the area
of public health and safety in all of these cases. 22 6 After Silkwood and

Hillsborough County, it would appear that common law damages actions
would survive the implied conflict preemption hurdles defined by the
Court, absent clear indication of agency position to the contrary. If
the local regulations at issue in Hillsborough County did not create the
kind of obstacle to federal objectives required for preemption, the
more indirect regulation of common law damages actions would likely
not be sufficient, particularly given the long tradition of permitting
2 27
such actions.
Id. at 721.
219 Id.
220Id.
221Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 721.
222Id.
223Id.
224 See supra notes 160-166, 172-177 and accompanying text (discussing McDermott and
218

CloverleafButter).
225 See supra notes 191-199 and accompanying text (discussing Silkwood); see also Davis,
supra note 15, at 983-90 (discussing narrowing of implied preemption doctrine during
1960s and 1970s).
226 See HillsboroughCounty, 471 U.S. at 715-16.
227 See id. at 716.
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C. The Rise of Express PreemptionDoctrine and the FDCA:
Cipollone and Medtronic
A short seven years after Silkwood, the Supreme Court reevaluated
22 8
preemption doctrine as it applied to common law damages actions.
In its 1992 decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the Court, applying preemption doctrine in a products liability action for the first
time, concluded that where Congress has included an express preemption provision, and that provision provides a reliable indicium of
congressional intent, the provision controls, and an implied preemption analysis is unnecessary.2 2 In such a case, the Court's task was only
to determine the scope of the provision. 230 Rarely had the Court given
exclusive control to an express preemption provision, particularly as it
2 31
applied to common law damages actions.
Because the FDCA does not contain an express preemption provision applicable to prescription drug labeling, Cipollone and subsequent
cases involving express preemption are not vital to the required analysis. Cipollone did, however, represent a significant change in the approach to preemption doctrine, and subsequent cases have built on its
greater focus on congressional intent and its treatment of the presumption against federal preemption of matters historically within the states'
police powers.2 32 The plurality opinion acknowledged that common law
damages actions can have an indirect regulatory effect, 23 3 but the dissenting Justices recognized that the Court's preemption cases had declined on several occasions to find the regulatory effects of state tort

228 Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992).
229Id. at 517. Cipollone involved preemption of products liability claims involving cigarettes. Id. at 509-10. It required interpretation of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (the "FCLAA") of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat 282 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000)), and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act (the
"PHCSA") of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). Cipollone 505 U.S. at 530-31..
230 See Cipollone,505 U.S. at 518, 523. The 1965 cigarette labeling act's preemption provision stated that "No statement relating to smoking and health ... shall be required on
cigarette packages or in advertising." Id. at 514 (quoting the FCLAA § 5(a)). The 1969 act
changed the preemption provision slightly to state that "[n]o requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law" regarding cigarette labeling or advertising. Id. at 515 (quoting the PHCSA § 5(b)). The use of the phrase "requirement or prohibition" was critical to the Court's analysis of whether common law
damages actions were prohibited. Id. at 522-24.
231SeeDavis, supranote 15, at 1001.
232See 505 U.S. at 516.
233Id. at 524.
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law either direct or substantial enough to warrant preemption.2 34 In the
next several products liability preemption cases, the Court adhered to
its focus on interpreting the scope of express preemption provisions
and also confirmed the importance of implied preemption principles
23 5
in the absence of Congress's explicit intent to preempt.

The Court next decided an FDCA express preemption provision
case in 1996, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 236 Medtronic involved application
of the express preemption provision of the MDA.2 37 The MDA directs

the FDA to regulate the safety and effectiveness of medical devices
based on the type of device involved and the method by which it is approved for marketing.2 38 The express preemption provision in the MDA
provides that states may not establish any requirement which is different from or in addition to any FDA imposed requirement regarding a
device's safety or effectiveness. 23 9 The defendant in Medtronic sought
preemption of the plaintiff's design and manufacturing defect claims
regarding its pacemaker because the device had been approved
through a premarket notification process, which permits market approval if a device is substantially equivalent to one already on the market. 240 The Court was divided on whether the MDA preempted the

plaintiff's claims, but all Justices agreed that the express preemption
241
provision controlled the analysis.

234

Id. at 537 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (referencing English v.Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S.

72 (1990); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988); and Silkwood, 464 U.S.
238).
235 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289-90 (1995) (interpreting the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (current version at 49
U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (2000))); stating that there was no preemption because the federal
agency had not promulgated the regulation addressing the product feature at issue); see
also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (holding that the Federal
Railroad Safety Act did not expressly preempt state common law damages actions based on
the location of railroad crossing devices because Congress's intent clearly permitted more
rigorous state regulation and rejecting agency interpretation of preemptive scope as inconsistent with the provisions' plain language).
236 518 U.S. 470, 474 (1996).
237 21 U.S.C.A. § 360k (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
23 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475-80 (detailing history of MDA and its regulatory
scheme).
23921 U.S.C.A. § 360k(a).
240 518 U.S. at 483.
241 Id. at 484-85, 503 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens's plurality opinion suggested that actual conflict implied preemption analysis may be appropriate in certain circumstances even when
an express preemption provision was at issue. Id. at 503 (plurality opinion) (citing Freightliner Corp, 514 U.S. at 287).
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Even though Medtronic involved express preemption analysis, a
number of important features of the decision may affect implied conflict preemption under the FDCA. 242 First, the Court reiterated the his-

toric primacy of state regulation to protect the health and safety of
their citizens, which supports the great latitude states have had to govern in this area. 243 The majority opinion confirmed that "we have long
presumed that Congress does not cavalierly preempt state law causes of
action." 244 That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns
and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and
safety.245 Consequently, the majority opinion considered the language
of the express preemption provision narrowly.246 The premarket notifi-

cation process, under which the pacemaker had been approved, did
not contain device-specific requirements. 2 47 Four Justices in the plurality opinion, therefore, concluded that nothing in the legislation, its history, or its basic purpose suggested that common law damages actions
were intended to be requirements, noting the singularly odd word
choice to accomplish a sweeping immunity.2 48 A majority of the Justices,
however, concluded that common law damages actions generally do
impose requirements, and, therefore, may be preempted under the
249
statute if they differ from a clearly expressed federal requirement.
Second, because the FDA had adopted a formal regulation to implement the preemption provision, 250 all three Medtronic opinions explored the importance of the agency's position on determining the
242 See id. at 475 (majority opinion); id. at 487-88 (plurality opinion); id. 495-96 (majority opinion).
245 Id. at 475 (majority opinion) (citing Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719).
244
245

Id. at 485.
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.

246 Id.
247 The pre-market notification requirement, also known as the 510k notification process, permits marketing of devices that are substantially equivalent to a device already on
the market and is not as rigorous as the pre-market approval process required of entirely
new devices. See id. at 476-80 (describing the processes and their differences). See generally
SUSAN FooTm, MANAGING THE MEDICAL ARMS RACE: INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY (1992).
24

Medtronic 518 U.S. at 487 (plurality opinion).

Id. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Breyer, whose opinion provided the final vote against preemption, stated that express preemption provisions should be interpreted based on their "clear
congressional command," if one exists. Id. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring). If none, courts
may infer that the "relevant administrative agency possesses a degree of leeway" to proscribe the preemptive effect of its regulation. Id.
20 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2) (2007) (no preemption of state or local requirements that
are "equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements" imposed under the MDA); id.
§ 808.1 (d) (1) (no preemption of "state or local requirements of general applicability").
249
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scope of preemption. 2 51 The Justices disagreed on the extent to which
they should rely on an agency's position on preemption, though in earlier cases the Court had noted that agency regulations could be informative on defining the scope of preemption where consistent with
statutory language. 252 The FDA did not consider common law damages
253
actions to be preempted by its device approval regulations.
The majority opinion's interpretation of the scope of the preemption provision was substantially informed by the agency's regula25 5
tions 254 because of the unique role given to the FDA by Congress.

256

After comparing the state common law requirements to the entirely
generic concerns of the federal regulations, the majority concluded
that the general common law obligations were no more a threat to
federal requirements than would be a state-law duty to comply with
local fire prevention regulations and zoning codes, or to use due care
in the training and supervision of a work force.2 57 The majority recognized, however, that where the federal government had weighed
the competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in
question, reached an unambiguous conclusion about how those competing considerations should be resolved in a particular case or set of
cases, and implemented that conclusion via a specific mandate on
manufacturers or producers, an entirely different case exists for pre2 58
emption under the statute and its implementing regulations.
Justice Breyer concurred, agreeing that the relevant administrative
agency possessed a degree of leeway to determine which rules, regulations, or other administrative actions will have preemptive effect. 259 In

particular, the FDA had a special understanding of the likely impact of
251

518 U.S. at 495-96 (-'he FDA regulations interpreting the scope of § 360k's pre-

emptive effect support the Lohrs' view, and our interpretation of the preemption statute is
substantially informed by those regulations."); id. at 505-06 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at
511-12 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
252 See CSX Transp., 507 U.S. at 670 (involving preemption of common law damages actions under the Federal Railroad Safety Act); Norfolk & S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S.
344, 355-56 (2000) (involving same and holding agency position on preemption not persuasive when inconsistent with prior agency position and with statutory scheme).
253 Porter, supranote 32, at 7-8.
254 Medtronic,518 U.S. at 495.
255 Id. at 496.
256 Id. The Court also noted that the FDA is uniquely qualified to determine whether a
particular form of state law "stands as an obstacle" to the fulfillment of federal objectives.
Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
257 Id. at 501-02.
258 Id. at 501.
259 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 505-06 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Hillsborough County,
471 U.S. at 721).

Boston College Law Review

1124

[Vol. 48:1089

both state and federal requirements, and also an understanding of
whether, or the extent to which, state requirements may interfere with
federal objectives, and the agency could translate these understandings
into particularized preemptive intentions accompanying its various
rules and regulations. 260 Justice Breyer concluded that the express preemption provision did not fully answer the preemption question.2 61 He
therefore applied implied preemption principles, in conjunction with
the FDA's own regulatory understanding of preemption, to conclude
that there was no actual conflict between the federal requirements and
the liability-creating premises of state tort law. 262 Justice Breyer had an

opportunity to employ those conflict preemption principles for the majority in the Court's next case on preemption of common law damages
263
actions.
D. Implied Conflict Preemption and the FDCA: Geier and Buckman Co.
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., a 2000 Supreme Court case,
Justice Breyer endorsed an implied conflict preemption analysis despite
2 64
the presence of an express preemption provision and a savings clause.
Geier involved allegations that a 1987 Honda was defective in design because it did not have a driver's side air bag.265 The National Traffic and

Motor Vehicle Safety Act authorized the Department of Transportation
66
to promulgate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards ("FMVSS").2
The Act's preemption provision states that whenever an FMVSS is in effect, states may not establish or maintain any safety standard applicable
to the same aspect of performance that is not identical to the federal
standard.2 67 The "savings clause" stated: "Compliance with any Federal

260

Id. at 506.
at 505.

261 Id.
262

Id. at 508. Justice O'Connor rejected the FDA's interpretation of the preemption

provision insofar as it purported to narrow the plain meaning of the statutory provision.
Id. at 509, 512 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part) ("It is not certain that an agency regulation determining the pre-emptive effect of any federal statute is entitled to deference, but
one pertaining to the clear statute at issue here is surely not.") (citation omitted).
263 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864 (2000).
264 Id. at 869.
26
5 Id.at 865.
266 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431
(1966) (current version at 49 U.S.CA §§ 30101-30169 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007)). An
FMVSS is statutorily defined as a "minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor vehicle
equipment performance." Id. § 1391(2) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 30102 (West
1997)).
2 67
Id. § 1392(d) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b) (1) (2000)).
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motor vehicle safety standard issued under this sub-chapter does not
2 68
exempt any person from any liability under common law."

The Department of Transportation issued FMVSS 208 regarding
Occupant Crash Protection in 1967. 269 After several revisions, the 1984
version, at issue in Geier,permitted manufacturers to choose, with some
restrictions, between air bags and seat belt systems. 270 The plaintiff's
1987 Honda did not have a driver's side air bag. 271 She was injured as a

result and sued the manufacturer based on the vehicle's defective design .272

Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, mirrored his analysis from
Medtronic, concluding that the express preemption provision did not
preempt the plaintiffs common law actions because that provision,
read together with the savings clause, did not disclose congressional
intent to defeat product liability claims in the face of only a federal
minimum standard of safety.273 The Court then concluded that im-

plied conflict preemption principles continued to operate to the extent that they prohibited actual conflict,274 reasoning that it would be

impermissible to "take from those who would enforce a federal law
the very ability to achieve the law's congressionally mandated objectives that the Constitution, through the operation of ordinary preemption principles, seeks to protect."275

2

68 Id. § 1397(k) (repealed 1994).

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34-38
(1983) (history of Standard 208); Pub. Citizen v. Steed, 851 F.2d 444, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("Passive restraint regulation (Standard 208) has advanced over the years along a protracted, winding, sometimes perilous course.").
270 529 U.S. at 865; see 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2007); 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962, 28,999 (July 17,
1984) (Standard 208). For a full discussion of the administrative history of FMVSS 208, see
Geier, 529 U.S. at 875-77; id. at 889-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Ralph Nader &
Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance with Federal Standards, 64 GEO.
WAsn. L. REv. 415 (1996).
271 Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
272Id.
273 Id. at 868.
274 Id. at 869.
275 Id. at 872. The Court had shown concern for "'careful regulatory scheme[s] established by federal law'" in its prior implied conflict preemption cases and concluded that
the regulatory scheme in Geier deserved such concern. Id. at 870 (quoting United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-07 (2000)). The Court's failure to rely on the express preemption
provision has been widely criticized, given its prior reliance on such provisions in both
Cipollone and Medtronic. See Davis, supra note 15, at 1005-13; see also Richard C. Ausness,
Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence
Since Cipollone, 92 Ky. LJ. 913, 967-68 (2003).
269
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The Court found that an actual conflict preempted the plaintiff's
action.27 6 The Court's determination of actual conflict in Geieris important to the prescription drug labeling cases in two important respects.
First, the Court rejected as conclusive the statutory definition of federal
standards as minimum standards of care. 277 Instead, the Court reviewed

carefully the history of the regulation that had been, at one time or another, unpopular with almost everyone.2 78 The views of the various Secretaries of Transportation on the objectives of the standard were very
influential. 279 Similarly, the comments to the original standard and the
current Secretary's position, described in an amicus brief in the case,
"[that] the 1984 version of FMVSS 208 'embodies the Secretary's policy
judgment that safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed
alternative protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular
system in every car,'" 2 80 were persuasive. The Secretary sought to bal-

ance a variety of concerns that impacted the primary objective of consumer safety, including obstacles to consumer acceptance of restraint
devices, industry reluctance to adopt restraint devices, and Congress's
responses to public pressures regarding the restraints. 28 1 The Court
recognized that the standard deliberately sought variety and was, there2 82
fore, neither a minimum nor a maximum standard.
Second, in defining the federal objectives at issue, the Court
placed some weight upon the Department of Transportation's own
interpretation of those objectives and its conclusion that the tort actions would stand as an obstacle to those objectives. 28 3 The Court justified that level'of attention-it did not use the word "deference"-to
the agency's position based on the technical subject matter, the complex and extensive nature of the relevant history and background,
and the agency's uniquely qualified position to comprehend the likely
284
impact of state requirements.

Geier, 529 U.S. at 881-82.
Id. at 874. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act defined the term
"safety standard" as a "minimum standard" for vehicle performance. 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (2)
(1966) (repealed 1994).
278 Geier, 529 U.S. at 875-77.
279 See id. at 877-85.
280 See id. at 881 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 25, Geier, 529 U.S.
276

277

861 (No. 98-1811)).
281 Id. at 877-79.
282
Id. at 878.
283 Geier, 529 U.S. at 883.
28

Id.
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The Secretary of Transportation's consistent position on preemption was also influential in supporting the Court's position. 28 That
position had been articulated in two recent cases, through amicus
briefs.286 The lack of a formal statement on preemption was, therefore, not determinative.2 87 Relying on Hillsborough County, the Court
rejected a requirement of a formal agency statement on preemption
to support conflict preemption. 288 Although the Court accepted that
it should not find preemption too readily in the absence of clear evidence of a conflict, it reasoned that to insist on a specific expression
of an agency's intent to preempt, made after notice-and-comment
rulemaking, in some cases would be to tolerate conflicts that an
agency, and therefore Congress, is most unlikely to have intended. 289

The Court weighed the stated federal objectives against the general interest that the states have in promoting the health and welfare
of citizens through compensation for injuries suffered from defective
products.2 0 The Court did not mention specifically the presumption
against preemption2 1 but was clearly sympathetic to the states' concerns. 92 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the state and federal
objectives could not be reconciled because such a state law, by its
terms, would have required manufacturers of all similar cars to install
air bags rather than other passive restraint systems, thereby presenting
an obstacle to the variety and mix of objectives sought by federal regulators.2 3 Although the Court acknowledged that Congress intended
some nonuniformity in the regulatory system it created, the Court
concluded that jury-assessed standards would lead to unpredictability
and uncertainty in the standard of due care.2 4 The Court recognized
that tort law may be different and that related considerations, such as
the ability to pay damages instead of modifying one's behavior, may be
relevant for preemption purposes, but those considerations were not
persuasive in this instance.2 5
285Id.
286 Id. (citing FreightlinerCorp., 514 U.S. 280; Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395

(lst Cir. 1988)).
287 Id. at 884.
288 Geier,529 U.S. at 884.
28
9 Id. at 884-85.
2m Id. at 882-83.
291 Id. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Davis, supra note 15, at 1008.
292 Geier, 529 U.S. at 882.
29

s Id. at 881.

294 Id. at 871.

mId. at 882.
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The Court's next preemption case again involved the Medical Device Amendments of the FDCA.2 96 In the 2001 case Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs Legal Committee, the Court was called upon to determine
whether the MDA preempted the plaintiffs' claim based on the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations to the FDA to obtain approval of
its orthopedic bone screws.297 The Court used implied conflict preemption principles without engaging in an express preemption analysis,
stating that the express preemption provision did not cover the matter.298 Because policing fraud on a federal agency was uniquely federal
and not traditionally governed by the states, the Court concluded that
the presumption against preemption did not operate. 99
The Court began by identifying federal objectives: the federal
regulatory scheme empowers the FDA to protect itself from and to deter fraud.300 The Court emphasized the need for flexibility in enforcing
that regulatory scheme given its other difficult (and often competing)
objectives, including generally protecting medical care practitioners
from unnecessary interference with the practice of medicine.30 ' The
Court did not mention the FDA's position on the preemption issue,
central to Medtronic and Geier, but the concurring opinion noted that
the FDA had waffled on the preemptive effect of its regulatory objec30 2
tives on state fraud-on-the-FDA claims.
The Court found that, because the state law claim was based on a
federal regulation and not on traditional tort principles, there was no

296

Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 344 (2001).

297 Id.
29

8 Id. at 348 n.2 ("[W]e express no view on whether these claims are subject to express

preemption.").
29 Id. at 347-48.
300 Id. at 348-49.
301 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 349-50.
302 Id. at 354 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).Justice Stevens noted:
Though the United States in this case appears to take the position that fraudon-the-FDA claims conflict with the federal enforcement scheme even when
the FDA has publicly concluded that it was defrauded and taken all the necessary steps to remove a device from the market, that has not always been its position. As recently as 1994, the United States took the position that state-law
tort suits alleging fraud in FDA applications for medical devices do not conflict with federal law where the FDA has "subsequently concluded" that the
device in question never met the appropriate federal requirements and 'initiated enforcement actions' against those responsible for fraudulently obtaining its approval.
Id. (citation omitted).
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corresponding benefit to the operation of state law.303 The tort law
deterrent effect could increase burdens on the medical device industry, potentially discouraging the request for approval of devices that
might have beneficial off-label uses, in contravention of the stated
goal of noninterference with medical practice.3 0 4 The Court noted,
however, that a traditional state tort action, not based on a federal
regulation, might survive.30 5
E. Final Words on Implied PreemptionDoctrine:Sprietsma and Bates
The Supreme Court's next two preemption opinions, Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine in 2002, and Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC in 2005, provide additional insight into the Court's implied conflict preemption
analysis, though both involve express preemption provisions. Both cases
address the importance of agency position on preemption and the
value of common law damages actions in regulating conduct.3 06
Sprietsma involved allegations of design defect against manufacturers of recreational boats that did not have propeller guards.30 7 The
Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971308 gave the Secretary of Transportation the authority, delegated to the Coast Guard, to establish a coordinated national boating safety program, including safety standards
for boating equipment to establish uniform safety regulations. 3 °9 The
Coast Guard, after gathering data and holding public hearings over a
several-year period, decided for reasons of safety, feasibility, and econonics not to require such guards. 310 The boat manufacturer argued
303 Id. at 352-53 (majority opinion) (federal enactment is critical element of claim,
contrasting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 241, and Medtronic 518 U.S. at 481).
50
4Id.at 350.
305 Id. at 353 ("In sum, were plaintiffs to maintain their fraud-on-the-agency claims
here, they would not be relying on traditional state tort law which had predated the federal enactments in question."). Buckman, therefore, could be said not to involve a conflict
at all between federal and state interests because states do not have an interest in protecting the FDA from fraud claims. See id. For a further discussion of this "false conflict" analysis in preemption, see generally MaryJ. Davis, On Preemption, CongressionalIntent and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. Prrr. L. REv. 181 (2004).
306 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445-46 (2005); Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69-70 (2002).
07 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 55. The plaintiff's wife had been thrown from a boat and was
killed when struck by the propeller blades. Id. at 54.
-8 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000).
W9S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 1333-35 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333.
310 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 59-60. The Coast Guard referred the study to the National
Boating Safety Advisory Council, as required under the statute. 46 U.S.C. § 4302(c) (4).
The Advisory Council's 1990 recommendation stated that the data did not support the
adoption of a regulation requiring propeller guards, but it would continue to monitor the

1130

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 48:1089

that the Coast Guard's decision preempted the plaintiffs claim based
311
on lack of a guard.
The Court, consistent with Geier, found no express preemption
and engaged in an implied conflict preemption analysis. 3 12 In assessing
the strength of the federal and state governmental policies at stake, the
Court emphasized that the Coast Guard regulations had preserved state
authority pending the adoption of specific federal regulations.3 13 The
Coast Guard had been in favor of permitting state common law
claims.3 14 Although the Court noted that a federal agency decision not
to regulate might have preemptive force, the Court found no such
force in this case because of the more prominent safety objectives moti3 15
vating the Coast Guard's decision.
The Court's most recent preemption decision made some important, general observations about the delicate balance that must be
achieved in determining the scope of preemption. 316 Bates involved
whether common law tort actions challenging the labeling of pesticide
were preempted under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (the "FIFRA"). 317 The lower courts had found express preemption of all claims based on a statutory provision forbidding states
from imposing requirements for labeling in addition to or different
from those required under FIFRA. 318 They reasoned that a jury finding
under state law would induce the defendant to alter its pesticide labelimig, which the Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") had approved.31 9 The EPA had taken inconsistent positions on preemption in
320
the previous five years, first in favor of the operation of state tort law
3 21
and then in favor of preemption.

issue for additional information on the state of the design art. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 61
(quoting 1990 letter to the Advisory Council).
31 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 55.
312 Id. at 63-64. Like the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in Geier, the
Federal Boat Safety Act had both an express preemption provision and a savings clause. Id.
at 62-63.
313Id. at 64.
314Id. at 65-66. The Court emphasized the government's consistent position that the
regulation did not have any preemptive effect. Id. at 66.
315 Id. at 69-70. Finally, the general federal interest in uniformity was an insufficient
objective, without more, to create a conflict. Id. at 70.
316Bates, 544 U.S. at 445-46.
-17 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000); 544 U.S. at 434.
318Bates, 544 U.S. at 436.
319
Id. at 434-36.
320Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Serv., Inc., 993 P.2d 366, 374-78 (Cal. 2000).
321Bates, 544 U.S. at 437 n.7.
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The Court's discussion of the history of FIFRA regulation reads
much like the history of FDCA regulation.3 2 2 For example, the Court
noted that prior to 1910, the states provided the primary and possibly
the exclusive source of regulatory control over the distribution of poisonous substances. 3 23 The history of the FDCA regarding drugs is virtually identical.A24 In addition, the Court noted that FIFRA imposes
misbranding liability for labels that are false or misleading in any particular, 25 just as the FDCA does for prescription drugs and devices.
The addition to FIFRA, in 1972, of an express preemption provision
that governs the continuing role of the states in pesticide regulation is
the primary difference between the two statutory schemes.3 26 In addition, the EPA does not determine or endorse the efficacy of pesticides
it approves for marketing, 27 unlike the FDA's drug approvals, which
3 28
do review efficacy claims.
In an interesting nod to preemption opponents generally, the
Court noted that tort litigation against pesticide manufacturers had
been taking place for decades, before and after the enactment of FIFRA in 1947, and that it was not until after Cipollone in 1992, that a
groundswell of preemption arguments based on FIFRA were advanced. 329 The Court concluded that most claims at issue were not preempted but remanded the case for further inquiry regarding the label330
ing claims.
The Court rejected the theory, relied on by the lower courts, that
simply because a jury verdict might have the effect of inducing a manufacturer to make a labeling change, the damages action was therefore
preempted.3 3 1 The Court reasoned that a requirement is a rule of law
that must be obeyed, whereas an event, such as a jury verdict, that
merely motivates an optional decision is not a requirement.3 3 2 Consequently, state law requirements that are equivalent to or consistent with
FIFRA regulations survived.33 3 Parallel state requirements imposed on
322Id. at 437-38.
323Id. at 437.

See supra notes 65-89 and accompanying text.
325Bates, 544 U.S. at 438.
326 Id. at 439.
3 7
2 Id. at 440.
328 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
32 Bates, 544 U.S. at 441.
$30 Id. at 452-53.
331 Id. at 445-46.
332 Id. at 445. The Court stated, 'he inducement test is unquestionably overbroad .... "
324

Id.
333

Id. at 447.
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manufacturers will provide an additional incentive to comply -with the
33 4
federal requirements.
The Court took a dim view of expansively reading Congress's intent
to preempt given the long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous substances, which adds force to the basic presumption
against preemption.3 3 5 The Court reiterated that if Congress had intended to prevent the operation of a long available form of compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent more clearly.336 Further,

private remedies that enforce federal misbranding requirements would
seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA, which contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over time as manufacturers
gain more information about their products' performance in diverse
settings. 3 37 Tort suits, the Court reasoned, can act as a catalyst in this ef33 8

fort.

F. Synthesis of PreemptionDoctrine
The Supreme Court's discussion in Bates of the benefit of tort
suits in warning cases and the value of those tort actions historically in
regulating warnings serves as an important bridge to the implied preemption issue under the FDCA.33 9 The following implied preemption
principles derived from the Court's cases will impact how the Court
analyzes the prescription drug labeling cases.
The presumption against preemption maintains vitality particularly in cases involving traditional areas of historic state power.3'4 The
33 Bates, 544 U.S. at 448-49. The Court rejected the notion that FIFRA contained a
nonambiguous command to preempt," given that the EPA had just five years earlier advocated against preemption. Id. at 449.
335 Id. at 449; see id. at 456, 459 (Thomas, J., concurring) (also endorsing a narrow view
of cases in which implied preemption is permitted).Justice Thomas noted:

Today's decision thus comports with this Court's increasing reluctance to expand federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of implied preemption .... This reluctance reflects that preemption analysis is not [a]
freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with
federal objectives, ... but an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of
state and federal law conflict.
Id. at 459 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
6
s Id. at 449 (majority opinion).
337 Id. at 451.
338

Id.

For a discussion of the effect of Bates on prescription drug labeling preemption, see
OWEN, PRODUcTs LIABmtrrv LAw (2d ed. forthcoming 2008).
34o See supra notes 335-338 and accompanying text. The presumption against preemption has also been described as an assumption of nonpreemption that is not triggered in
339

DAvm

G.
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presumption is especially forceful in implied conflict preemption doctrine because a determination of actual conflict is intended to be a
substitute for congressional intent, and, because it is a weak substitute,
the Court has been careful to require strong, clear evidence of such
conflicts. The Court continues to be sensitive to the role that tort actions play in motivating conduct, and in Geier it even left open the
possibility that tort actions might survive preemption if narrowly
drawn.3 41 The Court appeared, after Cipollone and Medtronic, to be distancing itself from the protections its preemption doctrine had long
provided to common law damages actions. 3 42 Geier was similarly reluc343
tant to discuss specifically the presumption against preemption.
Sprietsma and Bates, however, discuss favorably the long-standing role
of tort litigation in regulating public health and safety and emphasize
the concurrent role of the states in that regulation. 344 In addition, the
Court has reiterated in Bates that where compensation remedies are
not otherwise available, the courts should be very hesitant to deny
345
protection to those injured by regulated conduct.
Determining whether an actual conflict exists will involve an assessment of the federal objectives at stake, as identified through the
legislation; the regulations promulgated pursuant to it; the history of
that regulation; and the agency's views on the scope of the regulatory
scheme. 346 The consistency of the government agency's position in
defining the objectives and their preemptive reach will be instructive.
But the Court has never described the consideration it has given to
agency position regarding preemption as deferential; indeed, the
Court seems to go out of its way not to speak in terms of deference to
the agency on preemptive scope. 347 The Court considers carefully the
factors that support a finding of actual conflict, and agency position
on preemption is one such factor. An agency's position on preemptive
scope may be persuasive, given its expertise regarding the federal obareas of significant federal presence. Locke, 529 U.S. at 108 (involving preemption of state
policies regarding Burma; because foreign affairs are exclusively federal preemption was
found).
341See supra notes 294-295 and accompanying text.
342 See generallyBuckman, 531 U.S. 341.
313 529 U.S. at 868.
3" See Bates, 544 U.S. at 449; Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 70.
345 544 U.S. at 449-50.
346 See supra notes 251-256, 283-289, 313-315, 334 and accompanying text (discussing
importance of agency position in Medtronic, Geier, Sprietsma, and Bates).
347 See supra notes 251-256, 283-289 and accompanying text (noting differences of
opinion over level of consideration to be given to agency position in Medtronicand Geier).
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jectives at issue, but not as to the legal conclusion to be drawn from
them.
Federal regulatory action necessarily involves a balancing of objectives, sometimes conflicting ones, and requires careful tailoring of
the available means to implement those objectives. Does the decision
to approve a prescription drug label constitute the kind of particularized balance that will defeat longstanding tort actions which treat
such labeling decisions as minimum standards of conduct to be evaluated by the liability-creating premises of state tort law?s 48 Whether

state tort claims actually conflict with or complement the federal prescription drug labeling scheme requires close attention to the details
of the balance struck by that regulatory scheme.
IV.

DEFINING ACTUAL CONFLICT IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG
LABELING PREEMPTION

This Part applies the analysis of implied preemption doctrine to
the prescription drug labeling context. 349 The FDA's arguments in
favor of implied conflict preemption are reiterated, and then the Supreme Court's implied conflict preemption doctrine is applied to
those arguments. 350 Finally, insights gleaned from the Court's broader
preemption doctrine aid in supporting the ultimate conclusion that
implied conflict preemption of products liability claims is not sup351
ported by FDA labeling regulations.
A. The Arguments for Implied Conflict Preemption

Manufacturers who support preemption must define an actual,
direct, and clear conflict between state law and federal objectives that
requires the conclusion that those federal objectives will be frustrated
by the concurrent operation of state tort laws. 352 The Court continues

to require that traditional state regulation of health and safety not be

'48 Both HillsboroughCounty and Geier emphasized the importance of the particular balance that the federal regulations sought that might support a finding of actual conflict. See
supra notes 216-220, 280-289 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 352-457 and accompanying text.
S50 See infra notes 352-440 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 441-457 and accompanying text.
352 See Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942); Savage v.Jones, 225
U.S. 501, 533, 537 (1912).
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preempted absent strong evidence of an actual, direct, and clear con3 53
flict impairing the accomplishment of defined federal objectives.
General federal objectives to promote health and safety do not
suffice to conflict with state tort laws and support implied preemption
because of the assumption that state laws must be permitted to operate in traditional areas of public health and safety. An actual conflict
that impliedly preempts must be based on particularized federal goals
that state-mandated actions directly frustrate. The Court's early implied preemption cases involving the FDA make this point 54 as do all
the modern implied preemption cases.35 5 Indeed, the FDA has ac-

knowledged that its labeling regulations do not, as a general proposi3 56
tion, preempt all failure-to-warn claims based on approved labeling
and that "preemptive conflict does not exist in every instance in which
state tort law seeks to impose liability for the failure to provide a warning not affirmatively mandated by FDA." 357 The FDA has articulated
three concerns that its labeling regulations seek to address within the
primary goal of ensuring that safe and effective drugs are made avail358
able to the public; the following Sections explore these concerns.
1. Defining Federal Objectives: Over-Warning
First, the FDA asserts that permitting jury verdicts based on approved labeling will encourage manufacturers to warn physicians of
unsubstantiated risks and thereby negatively impact medical treatment
by inducing physicians to make inappropriate medical treatment decisions. 3 59 This potential over-warning of risks may thus deter the use of

an otherwise beneficial drug in circumstances when it is advised.
nsSee supra notes 215-223, 276-295, 310-315 and accompanying text (discussing evidence required to support finding of actual conflict); see also Kefauver-Harris Amendments
to FDCA, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 321
(West 1999 & Supp. 2007)) (incorporating requirement that "direct and positive conflict"
between amendments and state law be established to support preemption).
354 See supra notes 151-181 and accompanying text.
355 See supra notes 215-223, 276-295, 310-315 and accompanying text.
356 Amicus Curiae Letter Brief of FDA to Judge Stewart Dalzell at 11, Perry v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (No. CIVA 05-5350) (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2006).
357 Id.
35 See infra notes 359-377 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text; see also Brief of United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant at 16, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., No. 06-3107 (3d Cir.
June 23, 2006) [hereinafter Colacicco Amicus Brief of United States] In an amicus brief, the
United States argued:
Under-use of a drug based on dissemination of unsubstantiated warnings may
deprive patients of efficacious, possibly live-saving treatment .... Rather than
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The experience with antidepressants documented by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in the 2000 case Motus
v. Pfize, Inc. illustrates these concerns. 36° The FDA studied the alleged
association between SSRI antidepressants and the risk of suicide on a
number of separate occasions, both before and during the approval
process for Zoloft. 361 Although the FDA never prohibited SSRI manu-

facturers from altering the labeling, 362 it is clear that FDA regularly and
consistently from 1991 to 2006 denied that labeling revisions were warranted to enhance the available information about the risk of suicidality from the use of SSRIs. 363 The FDA has consistently argued since

2002 in favor of conflict preemption regarding the labeling of SSRIs
because it specifically determined that additional warning of the risk of
suicidality was not required by the available evidence. 364 Whether such
a decision actually conflicts with a common law damages action asserting a need for the warning requires assessment of the remaining asserted federal objectives and their state counterparts.
2. Minimum or Maximum Standards
Second, even though the FDA has long articulated that its regulations establish only minimum standards, the FDA now asserts that in
some cases its individual labeling decisions establish more.3 65 The

FDA considers certain labeling approvals to define optimal standards
from which deviation is not permitted absent specific FDA ap-

set minimum standards for warnings in drug labeling, FDA seeks to encourage the optimal level of use in light of reasonable safety concerns, by requiring scientific evidence of an association between a drug and a particular hazard before warning of that association on a drug's labeling.
Colacicco Amicus Brief of United States, supra, at 16.
360 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2000), rev'd on othergrounds, 358 F.3d 659 (9th
Cir. 2004).
361 Id. at 1089-90. Zoloft, first approved in 1991, was subsequently approved for four
additional medical conditions. Id. at 1089. During each subsequent approval process, the
FDA determined that a stronger warning of the causal connection between use of SSRIs
and suicide was not necessary. Id. at 1089-90. Of course, the FDA subsequently required a
stronger warning of the association between SSRIs and risk of suicide, in a "black box
warning" to emphasize the risk. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
362 Motus, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1093-94.
363 See Colacicco Amicus Brief of United States, supra note 359, at 8-12; see also Nagareda, supra note 21, at 25-28 (discussing SSRI regulatory action as "preemption by
statement rejection").
364 MotusAmicus Brief of United States, supra note 37, at 17-18.
365 See supranote 32 and accompanying text.
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proval. 366 This is the case with SSRI warnings. When a federal regulatory agency describes its standard as more than a minimum, as was
the case in the 2002 Supreme Court case Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co., a finding of actual conflict is more likely because the particular
federal balance may reflect a compromise with the very interests that
state tort law serves. 3 67 In 1996, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Court
viewed the question as a determination of whether the action was one
in which the federal government had weighed the competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in question, reached an
unambiguous conclusion about how those competing considerations
should be resolved in a particular case or set of cases, and implemented that conclusion via a specific mandate on manufacturers or
producers.3 68 If this is the case, one must ask the next question: what
considerations did the federal regulatory scheme balance, and does
state tort law directly conflict with that balance? Implied conflict preemption principles require courts to go beyond easy characterizations
to assess the actual regulatory action at issue before preempting traditionally complementary state tort actions.
3. Potential Misbranding Violations and Impossibility of Dual
Compliance
The FDA notes a third specific concern that, in some instances, a
manufacturer may be subject to a misbranding violation if it satisfies a
state common law damages action and alters a label that subsequently
does not meet with FDA approval. 369 In the case of SSRIs, for example, the FDA has expressed the opinion that a manufacturer would be
subject to a misbranding violation if it altered its label to comply with
a state tort action.37 0 Such a position implies that requiring a manufacturer to comply with a common law tort action's determination of
adequacy would render it subject to federal misbranding liability and
37 1
thus, make it impossible to satisfy both obligations.

supra notes 137-146 and accompanying text.
- 529 U.S. 861, 877-81 (2002).
- See518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996); supra notes 257-258 and accompanying text.
69 See Motus Amicus Brief for United States, supra note 37, at 17. The FDA posited that
even though manufacturers are permitted to alter warnings before FDA approval, the FDA
must ultimately approve an altered label, which, if found to be misleading, would not be
approved. Id. The brief stated, somewhat self-servingly, that the FDA would not have approved an altered Zoloft label. Id.
370 See ColaciccoAmicus Brief of United States, supra note 359, at 19.
371 See id.
36See
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The Court has rarely found conflict preemption based on impossibility because it has always considered it possible for the defendant to
comply with both state and federal regulations, for example by paying
3 72
tort damages and continuing to comply with a federal requirement.
3 73
In addition, the FDA must establish misbranding liability in court.
Misbranding liability does not attach automatically upon mere FDA assertion.3 74 Whether the Supreme Court would find that it is, indeed,
impossible to pay tort damages and simultaneously seek FDA regulatory
approval of a stronger warning or provide information to medical care
providers through other means, given that the regulations permit this
375
very course, is unlikely.
Each of these concerns-over-warning resulting in under-utilization of an effective drug and dilution of its otherwise valid warnings,
recognition of maximum standard-setting, and the potential misbranding violations that may result from complying with state tort law-are
the federal objectives that purportedly require conflict preemption of
concurrent state tort laws. 376 The next Section analyzes how these objectives are assessed under conflict preemption doctrine when compared to the state tort principles with which they are alleged to conflict. 377

B. Application of Implied Conflict Preemption
Based on general implied preemption principles and those applicable to the FDCA, prescription drug labeling preemption raises
several unresolved questions. First, how are the federal objectives to
be defmed in the case of prescription drug labeling with which state
tort laws arguable conflict? This inquiry requires a careful assessment
of the agency's position over time with sensitivity to the history of
those objectives. The debate over whether FDA regulations set mini372 For an example of impossibility, see McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 133-34
(1913), and, see also Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963) (discussing implied preemption involving impossibility).
373 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
374 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
375 A number of courts have rejected the impossibility component of the implied preemption argument. See, e.g., Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 666, 673-76
(E.D. Ky. 2006); Perry, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 684-85; Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WL
3041078, 1 21-23 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006).

376 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-35 (Jan. 24, 2006); see also Nagareda,
supranote 21, at 31-32 (rejecting misbranding concern).
377 See infra notes 378-440 and accompanying text.
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mum or maximum standards is central to defining the objectives in
conflict. Second, what effect does the historic presumption against
preemption of state regulation in the field of public health and safety
have when balanced against those federal objectives? The Court has
been hesitant to permit an overly aggressive assessment of federal ob3 78
jectives to swamp the importance of longstanding tort principles.
Third, does the indirect regulatory effect of common law damages
actions create an actual, direct, and clear conflict with the objectives
of the prescription drug labeling regulatory regime?
1. Federal Objectives of the Prescription Drug Labeling Regulations
As early as the Supreme Court cases of Savage v. Jones and McDermott v. Wilson, decided in 1912 and 1913 respectively, the objective of
the food and drug laws has been clear: to protect the public health
and safety from adulterated and misbranded drugs.3 79 The FDA, as
the undisputed expert federal public health agency charged with ensuring the safety and efficacy of the nation's drug supply, must be
given room to satisfy its public health mission substantially unimpeded. 38° The federal objectives of public safety, however, are not inconsistent with the historic primacy of the states in the field of public
health and safety. Because Congress has not expressed its intent to
preempt state regulation, even though it has done so regarding food
and drug laws on other occasions, 3 81 the states continue to be free to
fulfill their historic regulatory role.38 2
Implied conflict preemption doctrine substitutes for explicit congressional intent the assessment of actual conflict because Congress is
presumed to want its federal objectives to prevail over contrary state
law.383 Because congressional intent is implied based on a particular

set of circumstances, the fact that Congress has not defined a specific
preemptive scope supports defining those federal objectives with cau378

See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 454 (2005).

379 See

McDermott, 228 U.S. at 128; Savage, 225 U.S. at 529; supra notes 151-170 and accompanying text.
380 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934.
381 See Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA, 21 U.S.C.A § 360k (West 1999 &
Supp. 2007); see also supra notes 17-18, 129-131 and accompanying text.
3s2 Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715, 718 (1985);
see also Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1035-36 (S.D. Il. 2001)
(discussing FDA preemption position history).
m See HillsboroughCounty, 471 U.S. at 713.
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4
tion and particularity so as not to displace state law unnecessarily)
The Court, therefore, has been restrictive in its defimition of what
constitutes an actual, direct, and clear conflict with federal objectives.3 85 Those seeking to preempt state health and safety regulations
3 86
consequently face an uphill battle.
The long history of tort litigation38 7 in the prescription drug labeling area, in addition to the oft-repeated view that Congress would
not defeat the operation of a long available form of compensation
without making its intent to do so clear, 388 also support the requirement of clear, particularized federal objectives to which implied conflict preemption principles are to be applied in the prescription drug
labeling context.389 Strong evidence is needed to defeat the presump3 90
tion that state health laws are not impliedly preempted.
The FDA has asserted that, given its objective to ensure each
drug's optimal use through requiring scientifically substantiated warnings, a common law tort action would frustrate this purpose. 391 The
FDA expressed concern for the potential under-utilization of a drug
based on dissemination of scientifically unsubstantiated warnings,
which might deprive patients of beneficial, possibly lifesaving treatment.3 92 According to the FDA, a common law tort action might encourage the use of a warning that would diminish the impact of valid
3 93
warnings, creating an unnecessary distraction.
The FDA's stated objective to prevent over-warning is the kind of
general objective that, standing alone, is unpersuasive under this standard. 394 Manufacturers often raise over-warning concerns in warning
cases because of the fear that juries too easily impose liability based on
the hindsight that a particular warning would have prevented the plaintiffs injury, putting manufacturers in the position of having to warn
about everything. There is no support, however, for the assertion that

720-21 (defining federal goal narrowly in actual conflict preemption).
See supra notes 214-223, 276-289 and accompanying text (discussing actual conflict
as assessed in Hillsborough County, and Geier).
384See id. at

386

HillsboroughCounty, 471 U.S. at 714.

37 See Bates, 544
38

U.S. at 449.

See id. at 450; see also supra notes 329-338 and accompanying text.

3w See, e.g., Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 728-29 (D. Minn. 2005);
Caraker,172 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-39.
390Hillsborough County, 471 U.S, at 721.
391See Motus Amicus Brief of Unites States, supra note 37, at 23; see also

Brief of United States, supra note 359, at 13.
392Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra note 37, at 23.
393 Id. at 23-24.
394 See id. at 23.

olaciccoAmicus
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this phenomenon occurs in the prescription drug labeling context. Prescription drug labeling is directed at a very sophisticated physician audience. Any over-warning concern must be assessed given the learned intermediary audience, and it is a concern that the FDA substantiates only
with very general statements and no supporting data. 395 When com-

menting on the new labeling regulation, physicians uniformly re3 96
sponded that they wanted more, clearer information, not less.

Even if one acknowledges a general over-warning concern, the
FDA has recognized that approved labeling should not by itself preempt state damages actions based on that labeling.3

97

It would other-

wise be difficult to reconcile the FDA's objective to prevent overwarning-that it is beneficial to have less information about a drug's
possible risks rather than more-with its own regulation that requires
manufacturers to alter a label unilaterally to add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction.3 98 A physician
who might be inclined to withhold a particular drug treatment because of disclosed risks may do so for an infinite variety of reasons related to an individual patient's medical needs, only one of which may
be sensitivity to over-warning. A more specific regulatory action related to a particular label should be required as an initial matter before any over-warning concern can rise to the level necessary to prevent the concurrent operation of state tort laws which seek to
enhance available risk information, not restrict it.
2. Historic State Regulation and the Presumption Against Preemption
The traditional role of the states in regulating food and drug
safety, coupled with the historic recognition of the value of common
law damages actions in that effort, weighs heavily in the determination of whether state law directly and actually conflicts with federal
objectives in the field. As early as Savage and as recently as Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC, decided in 2005, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of state law, including state tort litigation, in
providing a remedial component of the regulatory scheme as well as
3
serving as a catalyst in aid of the federal regulatory effort.

99

See id. at 23-24.
See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
397 See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text (discussing FDA position asserted
in amicus letter brief in Perry).
398 See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text (discussing 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (6)
(2007)).
399 See Bates, 544 U.S. at 443; Savage, 225 U.S. at 539.
395

396
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The Court struggled in recent years with the relevance of the presumption against preemption of state police powers in express preemption analysis, but certainly returned to an emphasis on that presumption in 2002, in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine and more recently in Bates.4°0
A fortiori, the presumption against preemption in the implied preemption context is critical to prevent over-reaching of the traditional state
domain. The Court's opinions generally reflect this understanding. 401
For example, in 1985, in Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Laboratories, Inc., the Court considered the presumption against preemption to apply strongly and defeat implied field preemption. 402 Regarding conflict preemption, the Court found no evidence of an actual conflict because the stated federal objectives were too speculative
43
to be credited. 0
The Court did not mention the presumption by name in Geier,
though it was keenly aware of the value of state tort law in regulating
product safety and, more importantly, providing compensation for
injured parties. 40 4 The Court was influenced in Geierby the particularized nature of the federal objectives-the specific variety and mix of
passive restraint systems permitted a choice of design alternatives to
achieve a purposeful balance of restraint systems that would be defeated by permitting state tort actions to require only one of those
choices. 4 5 Permitting a choice of designs to achieve a deliberate balance in the automobile fleet over time was a conscious attempt to delay the accomplishment of maximum safety to enhance other goals of
consumer confidence and acceptance.
The objectives behind the FDA's particular labeling approvals
simply do not have the same character that supported the variety and
mix of objectives that were present in Geier. If specific prescription
drug labeling approvals support preemption, drug manufacturers
would receive, in essence, a free pass to avoid making the otherwise
See Bates, 544 U.S. at 448-50; Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63--66
(2002); supra notes 307-315, 334-336 and accompanying text.
401 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 882; Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 716-21; supra notes 207,
214-223, 291-292 and accompanying text.
402 See 471 U.S. at 716-21; supra notes 207, 214-223 and accompanying text.
403 See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 720; supra notes 207, 214-223 and accompanying
text.
404 See Geier,529 U.S. at 882; supranotes 291-295 and accompanying text.
405 Geier represents a strained assessment of actual conflict with which this author and
others disagree, See Davis, supra note 305, at 231-32; Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study injudicial Sleight of Hand: Did Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption
AgainstPreemption?, 17 BIUJ. PUB. L. 1, 2-3 (2002).
400
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statutorily required label changes with no simultaneous, conscious
purpose to enhance safety or availability. Drug manufacturers who
have, or could obtain information about increased risk that would
otherwise have to be disclosed will be protected from a failure to disclose. What incentive will then exist to explore postapproval risks and
obtain otherwise potentially adverse information? To justify the absolute protection from liability for withholding risk information from
sophisticated physicians that preemption would provide on the
chance that physicians may under-prescribe a dangerous drug requires much stronger support than the generalized concern of overwarning currently articulated.
It is clear that in assessing whether an actual conflict exists the
Court openly considers the importance of traditional state regulation
in the particular subject area as a strong counterweight to the stated
federal objectives in the balance. 4°6 If, as the FDA has asserted, its decision not to require a labeling change, as in the case of SSRIs, reflects
such a particularized balancing of risks, does its decision not to regulate then become preemptive? Geier held that it did; though Geier involved an explicit choice to reject a design alternative that was unambiguously safer to accommodate other objectives such as consumer
acceptance and reliance. 4 7 In Sprietsma, the Court rejected a finding
of implied conflict preemption in such a circumstance-when a federal agency had decided not to regulate-precisely because the
agency's conclusion was not an affirmative choice as in Geier, but a
decision not to choose. 4°8 In such a circumstance, the Court was right
to conclude that federal objectives did not defeat state tort actions,
and rather rely on them as the traditional means of increasing, incrementally, incentives toward safety.4°9 The Court refused to permit
410
an expert agency assessment to have greater effect than necessary.
Arguably, an FDA decision not to require a particular warning in
prescription drug labeling is more like the decision in Sprietsma than
it is the decision in Geier 41' The FDA decisions not to require a particular labeling change in SSRI labels did not prohibit manufacturers
from following the labeling change regulations; rather, it reflected the
conclusion that at each time, the citizen petitioners had not made a
406 See

supra notes 226, 243, 290-292 and accompanying text.

407529 U.S. at 886.
408

Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 67; Geier, 529 U.S. at 877-78.

See supra notes 314-315 and accompanying text.
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 67-68.
411 Contra Nagareda, supra note 21, at 30 (likening FDA decision in SSRI case to Geier).
409
410
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compelling case. At no time did any manufacturer seek permission to
alter a label; each FDA decision not to require a label change to SSRIs
was supported by manufacturers who, one might rationally conclude,
had an incentive to prevent the addition of more stringent warnings.
Such an FDA decision is more like a decision simply to permit the
regulatory scheme to continue operating and to require manufacturers to continue complying with it by seeking necessary labeling
changes consistent with those requirements.
And in any event, does the parallel operation of state tort laws
actually conflict with the objectives behind such a labeling decision?
The Court was openly hostile toward the proposed rejection of "longstanding" principles of tort compensation in Bates involving pesticide
labeling under FIFRA. 412 The Court confirmed its dedication to the
presumption against preemption in assessing Congress's intent and
noted that "[p]rivate remedies... would seem to aid, rather than hinder," the functioning of a public health and safety regulatory
scheme. 413 Bates involved a labeling approval regime less rigorous than
414
the FDA's but operating under an express preemption provision.
The concerns for the operation of traditional state tort principles expressed in Bates would seem to apply, a fortiori, more persuasively in
the case of implied conflict preemption under the FDCA.415
The stated federal objective behind the prescription drug labeling regulation, to prevent over-warning, does not actually conflict with
state common law tort actions. 4 6 The main general objective, protection of the public health, is certainly not in conflict with state tort actions but operates in a complementary way with them, as it has traditionally. The addition of a remedial scheme based on long-standing
state tort litigation "would seem to aid, rather than hinder" the functioning of a regulatory scheme based on warning claims, as the Court
found in Bates.4 17 There is no reason, other than the FDA's changed
position on preemption, to now treat common law tort actions differently than in the traditional way.

412

See Bates, 544 U.S. at 447-49; supra notes 330-335 and accompanying text.
U.S. at 451.

413 Bates, 544
414 Id. at

415

437-42.
See id.

416 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006).
417 544 U.S. at 451.
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3. Effect of the FDA's Changed Position on Preemption
The FDA argues that because labeling approval is solely within the
FDA's authority, state common law tort actions may interfere with the
balancing of risks that undergird that approval. 418 The concern of overwarning and the consequent possible disincentive to physicians to prescribe are at the core of this argument, but over-warning concerns are
not new. The FDA's approval processes continue to be complex and
thorough, but appear no more or less capable of assessing warning
adequacy today than in years past. To the extent that manufacturers
continue to be in control of the data available to substantiate the need
for revised warnings, the regulatory process has not changed. The
FDA's regulations still require unilateral change to labeling where necessary to identify an increased or different risk even if a causal association is not established. 419 The only real change in the regulatory process is the revised conclusion of preemption that the FDA and
manufacturers seek to draw from labeling decisions. 420 The recent
"groundswell" of effort to use preemption based on FDA approved labeling is another example of an overly aggressive application of the
Court's preemption cases.

421

The Court's implied conflict preemption doctrine rejects such a
change in agency position as insignificant in itself to support preemption. 42 2 The FDA's change in position regarding preemption is too re-

cent and too tied to specific litigation to constitute the kind of formal,
long-standing agency position, which has been credited as relevant to
assessing conflict preemption. In neither Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'Legal
Committee, decided by the Court in 2001, nor Bates was such a change in
agency position credited in the preemption analysis. 423 Bates involved
an express preemption provision, for which greater deference to

418

Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug

and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934.
419 Id. at 3949.
420 Id. at 3933-35.
421
See supra note 329 and accompanying text (noting "groundswell" of preemption arguments under FIFRA after Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), revived
express preemption analysis).
422 See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 354 n.2 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring).
423 See id.; supra notes 302, 334 and accompanying text; see also discussion of change in
agency position as irrelevant in CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993),
supra note 235.

1146

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 48:1089

agency interpretation might have been appropriate; nevertheless, the
Court refused to endorse it.424
The Court was "substantially informed" by the FDA's position on
preemption in Medtronic because Congress had expressly provided
authority to the FDA to determine when state regulations would be
preempted under the MDA. 425 The Court did not acknowledge that it
was required to give any level of deference to the FDA's interpretation
of its preemption authority; Justice O'Connor, in dissent, noted uncertainty as to whether any deference was required in such circumstances. 426 There is no formal preemption provision in the new prescription drug labeling regulation. There is only commentary in the
preamble. 427 There has been no comment from the health care community, either physicians or their organizations, or state public health
officials, on the FDA's position in favor of preemption. The proposed
regulation specifically disclaimed any intent to alter the FDA's formal
position on preemption and, rather, asked for comments on the
product liability implications of the proposed labeling regulation itself.428 The new preemption position is nothing more than an articu-

lation of the FDA's very recent litigation position-it is not a longstanding, formal policy, and the Court will likely dismiss any
description of it as such in an implied conflict preemption analysis.
An agency's interpretation of its own regulations is ordinarily accorded great deference. 429 The degree of that deference has been the
subject of much discussion in the Court's preemption opinions, including the opinions involving the FDA.430 Generally, though, the de-

gree of deference due to government positions depends on, among

424
425

426

See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
See supra notes and 250-258 and accompanying text.

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 512 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
131-133 and accompanying text. See generally Sharkey, supra note 4.
428 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs
and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082,
81,103 (Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201) ("[T]his proposed rule does
not preempt State law.").
429 See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). As to deference accorded FDA determinations, see 1 O'REILY, supra note 65,
§ 4:12 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2006). For additional discussion of the deference issue, see
427 See supra notes

Mark C. Levy & GregoryJ. Wartman, Amicus Curiae Efforts to Reform Product Liability at the
Food and DrugAdministration:IDA's Influence on FederalPreemption of Class III MedicalDeices
and Pharmaceuticals,60 FooD & DRUG L.J. 495, 504-07 (2005); Nagareda, supra note 21, at

23-24; Zieve & Wolfman, supra note 30, 308.
4 See supra notes 215-223, 251-256, 302 and accompanying text (discussing Hillsborough County, Medtronic, and Buckman Co.).
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other things, consistency, formality, and thoroughness. 43 1 Briefs are
not accorded great policy deference, 4 2 particularly when the agency
interprets statutes or regulations in a particular case, at such a time
and in such a manner so as to provide a convenient litigating position
for a particular action. 43 3 The FDA's efforts to obtain greater deference in the MDA context have met with limited success precisely be434
cause the FDA is interpreting its own regulation on preemption,
but even the change in FDA position in the MDA context is being met
with significant skepticism. 43 5 Similarly, in Bates, the EPA changed its
position on preemption within a few years, based on its interpretation
of an express preemption provision, and the Court found those arguments particularly dubious because the agency reversed a long436
standing no-preemption interpretation.
Although the Court has rejected an absolute requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking to justify giving some weight to an
agency position on preemption, the consistency and thoroughness of
the preemption position is critical for it to be persuasive. 43 7 The FDA's
historic position in favor of the concurrent operation of traditional
state tort claims is a significant barrier to the recognition of its current
preemption position as consistent with federal objectives. The Court
has been cautious about the effect of changed agency position, particularly for litigation purposes, as support for preemption. 438 Conflict preemption requires assessment of actual conflict based on a particular
regulatory act, not from a statutory or regulatory preemption provision. An agency's determination of whether an actual conflict exists is
not an ex ante determination based on policy but, rather, is an ex post
assessment based on reflection regarding prior circumstances. Only in
Geier, in which the Court found implied conflict preemption, was
451United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); see also Witezak, 377. F. Supp.
2d at 730 (explaining that Motus Amicus Brief of United States not given deference because there is reason to suspect that briefs interpretation does not reflect "fair and considered judgment" of agency on issue).
432 Witczak, 377 F. Supp. 2d. at 730; Nat'l Pharm. Alliance v. Henney, 47 F. Supp. 2d 37,
39-41 (D.D.C. 1999). See generally 1 O'REiLLY, supra note 65, at § 4:12 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp.
2006).
433 See O'REILLY, supra note 65, at § 4:12 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2006).
43 Riegel v. Medtronic, 451 F.3d 104, 125 (2d Cir. 2006); Horn v. Thoratec, Inc., 376
F.3d 163, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2004).
435 See Ausness, supra note 30, at 767-69.
436544 U.S. at 449.
437 Geier, 529 U.S. at 885; see supra note 289 and accompanying text.
438 See, e.g., Bates, 544 U.S. at 437 n.7; Buckman, 531 U.S. at 354 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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agency position persuasive, and that was based on the Secretary of
Transportation's unwavering position on the importance of the federal
objectives at issue, and not on a position about preemption per se. 43 9 In
the railroad safety regulation cases, the agency's change in preemption
position was rejected as inconsistent with the statutory scheme and,
thus, of no effect in the express preemption analysis. 44° Although
agency position is given some persuasive treatment, in the case of implied conflict preemption of traditional state tort actions, consistency of
position regarding the federal objectives at issue is more important
than recency of preemption position in assessing actual conflict.
C. EstablishingDirect Conflict: The Dynamic Nature of Risk Information
and Minimum Standards
In assessing whether an actual, direct, and clear conflict exists to
support implied preemption, the proponent of preemption must establish that conflict with particularized evidence of federal objectives,
as explained in Hillsborough County.441 The best argument for preemption in the prescription drug labeling context will be based on the
FDA's specific consideration, and subsequent rejection of particular
labeling proposed by a manufacturer that the FDA finds to be unsubstantiated based on the available data. The Court is unlikely to be persuaded by the speculation and hyperbole that the regulatory sky is
falling if a labeling change proposed by tort claimants is permitted,
however, and in this context the long-standing characterization of
FDA labeling approval decisions as minimum standards will weigh in
favor of finding no conflict.
In the prescription drug labeling context, the dynamic nature of
the scientific understanding of risk and the way that risk is discovered
and appreciated by manufacturers, regulators, and physicians disfavor
preemption. In Bates, which involved pesticide labeling, the Court refused to give broad scope to the preemption provision at issue because doing so would stifle an otherwise dynamic need to continually
evaluate risks about which warnings should be provided. 442 Inertia is a
powerful force: if preemption is available based on a particular labeling approval, what manufacturer would expend effort and resources
to identify the need for any further labeling change? The onus would
439
440

441
442

See supra notes 279-281 and accompanying text.
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
See 544 U.S. at 451; supra notes 336-337 and accompanying text.
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be on the FDA and the public to police the scientific advances regarding each prescription drug approved and then propose and establish
the need for labeling changes without the active assistance of the
manufacturers, who would have no financial incentive to support a
label change. Why would a manufacturer spend any resources on acquiring information about a product's risks when a label already protects it from liability?
.This is, in effect, where the process is now because manufacturers
rarely propose labeling changes postmarket and, when they do, it is often too little, too late. To place the postmarket obligation exclusively on
the FDA and other public groups would destroy the ability of the FDA
to regulate effectively the postmarketing risks stemming from the large
number of prescription drugs it oversees. One can only imagine the
paralysis that would accompany any labeling approval to which preemption attached under such a scheme.
Indeed, many commentators, and also more recently the Government Accountability Office, have criticized the FDA's inability to
obtain full information from prescription drug manufacturers because the reporting process for postapproval adverse reaction events
and clinical trials is too weak. 443 The FDA does not have sufficient authority to require additional clinical trials after drug approval. 4 " Consequently, many have argued that the tort litigation system acts as an
important avenue by which the health care community learns of safety
and efficacy information. 445
Professor Richard Nagareda has suggested that one of the preconditions for preemption should turn on the provision of information by
manufacturers that is the logical predicate for a regime of optimal
regulation. 446 This proposal is entirely consistent with the current way
tort law operates, sub silentio, under the presumption against preemption in the balance against purported federal objectives. Unless federal
objectives can be articulated in a way that ensures, in the labeling context, that manufacturers have a continuing incentive to enhance a
product's safety through acquiring and sharing risk information, actual

44

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
supra note 77, at 11.

444 See GAO REPORT, DRUG SAFETY,

445 Joe Pickett, PressureBuildingfor FDA to Mandate Post-Approval Studies After Vioxx Incident, 4 BIORESEARCH MONITORING ALERT, Dec. 1, 2004, at 1 (explaining that FDA cannot

mandate post-marketing safety programs; FDA has never been given enough staff to "keep
careful track of adverse reactions that are reported for drugs.") (citations omitted); Young,
supra44note 32, at 1.
6 Nagareda, supra note 21, at 40-41.
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conflict is not established. Professor Nagareda soundly envisions that
preemption doctrine can maximize the flow of information to enhance
regulatory decision making and provide manufacturers with protection
447
against the operation of the tort system.
Professor Richard Epstein asserts, to the contrary, that information about potential risks is available from a wide variety of other
sources, so preemption of tort claims will not prevent the availability
of adverse risk information. 448 Professor Epstein proposes a broad
sweep for preemption of tort claims under an expanded notion of
field preemption, out of a greater concern for enhancing product
innovation by streamlining the regulatory processes in general. 449 The
proposal that the entire drug regulatory process needs improvement
produces no disagreement and is not inconsistent with permitting
tort claims as an oversight mechanism regarding currently approved
products and knowledge of their true risks. Such actions ask for assessment of the very information that Professor Epstein suggests is
otherwise widely available and that the FDA also seeks: information
about risk that may change the very reason the product was approved-to enhance the users' health safely and effectively.45 0 He acknowledges that the reason for allowing products to stay on the market despite their risks is to permit users the opportunity to selfselect. 451 Self-selection occurs only with full information, in this instance, to the medical care provider. Availability of full information is
not possible while the system intended to encourage that full disclosure provides no effective mechanism to ensure its availability.
One example will illustrate the weakness of the FDA regulatory
system that should weigh against preemption. Merck & Co. received
approval from the FDA to market its anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx for
use in treating arthritis pain in February 1999.452 In June 2000, Merck
submitted data to the FDA disclosing a four-fold higher risk of heart
attacks compared to another pain-reliever, but not until April 2002 did
the FDA approve a new warning that referred to an increase in cardio-

447 See id. at 41.
"8 Epstein, supranote 21, at 30.
449 Id. at 26, 30-31.
450 See id. at 30.
451 See id. at 32.
452 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1567, 2007 WL 195296, at *3-4 (E.D.
La. July 3, 2007). For a discussion of the circumstances involving Vioxx, see generally Jonathan O'Steen & Van O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the Argument Against FederalPreemption of State ClaimsforInjuriesResultingfromDefective Drugs, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 67 (2006).
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vascular risks.45 3 Merck voluntarily recalled Vioxx from the market in
September 2004, because results of another clinical trial vindicated the
first and indicated a doubled risk of cardiac events in those who used

Vioxx. 454 After Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market Congress held

hearings on the FDA's alleged regulatory failure to require stronger
warnings sooner.455 The FDA spokesman that stated the FDA needed
more regulatory authority to require warning labels after safety concerns surface postapproval. 4 6 The Vioxx warning label change was de457
layed for one year while the FDA and Merck negotiated over it.
Although the current practice may be that manufacturers wait for
FDA approval before making labeling changes, that practice does not,
nor should it, prevent manufacturers from acting on risk information.
The statutory scheme imposes on manufacturers a greater obligation
to protect the public safety. Tolerating or ignoring a failure to fulfill
that obligation is inconsistent with the statutory mandate. The FDA
may tolerate, even encourage, the practice of permitting manufacturers to not change labeling until approval is obtained, but permitting
common law tort actions to operate concurrently does not conflict with
either the statutory or regulatory mandate that requires more. Tort liability might increase the likelihood that manufacturers will seek FDA
approval of a labeling change, pursuant to the obligation to add significant risk information unilaterally based on evidence that is only
available to it and, perhaps, only likely to be disclosed through the
litigation process. In this way, state tort claims advance, rather than
conflict with, federal objectives.
CONCLUSION

To permit preemption based on an FDA-approved label, even
one that specifically rejected proposed language as unsubstantiated,
will create a disincentive to manufacturers to act promptly based on
acquired evidence of risk. Indeed, it creates a disincentive to seek in
the first instance evidence of increased risks or adverse side effects
which may be available. Knowledge of adverse side effects and evidence of increased risk come to drug manufacturers in a wide variety

453
454
455
456
457

O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 452, at 68.
Id. at 67-68.
See EnsuingDrug Safety, supra note 76.
See id.
In re Vioxx 2007 WL 195296, at *4.
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of ways. 458 The FDA approves labels based on information submitted
to it by manufacturers, 459 and it relies on manufacturers to provide
the information required under its regulations. 460 The FDA is not an
investigative agency; it is a regulatory agency. It, like other regulatory
agencies, receives information from members of the industry it regulates and acts on that information. It does not actively seek out information to accomplish these goals unless information is brought to it
highlighting a need to do so. The tort litigation system is one such
avenue of information that would be closed if preemption operated
under these conditions; it is an avenue that needs to operate concurrently with the regulatory system that does not have authority to require the regulated industry to engage in efforts to obtain or report
all adverse risk information. 461
The history of SSRI antidepressant labeling used throughout this
Article is instructive. 462 Citizen petitions were presented to the FDA
on three occasions seeking to convince the FDA to require an enhanced label regarding the risk of suicidality.463 The FDA refused to
require such a label until 2004, when it issued a public health advisory
to that effect. 464 The FDA asked manufacturers for additional information about studies on other antidepressants and ultimately acknowledged that additional data and analysis were needed, including
increased public discussion. This information was slow to materialize
and were it not for the actions of nonmanufacturers, it might never
have. If preemption had been available, and the common law tort system had not been active to bring some of this information to light,
the warning might not yet be provided. Indeed, it is wrong to suggest

4
See Motus Amicus Brief of Public Citizen, supra note 46, at 18-19; see also Catherine
T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: PostmarhetingSurveillance, Compensation and the Role of
Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 587, 591 (2005) (preemption removes
opportunity for litigation system to aid in effort to monitor product safety).
-9 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2007) (content for format of an application for new drug approval).
460 Id. § 314.80 (post-marketing reporting of adverse drug experiences).
41 See EnsuringDrugSafety, supra note 76.
462 See supra notes 358-377 and accompanying text.
463 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
46" Public Health Advisory, FDA, Worsening Depression and Suicidality in Patients Being Treated With Antidepressant (Mar. 22, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/
drug/antidepressants/AntidepresanstPHA.htm (recommending labeling for antidepressants like Zoloft be modified to reflect potential suicide risks).
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that the FDA rejected a stronger warning in the case of SSRIs because
the manufacturers never sought it. 465

The FDA's final argument that its regulations provide optimal,
not minimum, standards is inconsistent with the regulatory scheme it
administers. The unilateral obligation of manufacturers to alter warnings when substantial risk information comes to them and the FDA's
inability to require postmarketing trials to obtain risk information
substantially undercut any argument that the labeling regulation was
intended to provide a maximum standard of care. In the case of prescription drug labeling, there is unlikely ever to be full information of
risk on which to base the conclusion that any labeling should be considered a maximum, or optimal, one, frozen for all time with only the
regulated industry with an incentive to shed additional light.
Implied conflict preemption based on approved drug labeling
would be an expansive application of the Court's conflict preemption
doctrine. The FDA's new position on preemption, applied not retroactively but prospectively, might one day be characterized as a consistent agency position on preemption for those prescription drugs that
fall within it. That day is in the distant future. As to currently produced and marketed prescription drugs, the FDA's long-standing and
traditional position against preemption will continue to control.
No labeling regulation can create the perfect incentive for manufacturers to seek better and more complete information regarding the
adverse side effects of the prescriptions we take. In a world where U.S.
patients receive proper medical care only fifty-five percent of the
time, 466 pharmaceutical companies are in control of the research
46 7
conducted on their products premarketing and postmarketing,
pharmaceutical sales representatives have increasing influence on the
drugs that physicians prescribe, 468 and the pharmaceutical industry is
the largest lobbying group in the United States, 469 the products liabil465 See generally Brief of Appellants, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., No. 06-3107 (3d Cir. June
23, 2006).
466
ProperHealth Care Put at 55%, Assoc. PRESS, Mar. 16, 2006 (on file with the Boston

College Law Review), available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/bclawreview/PastIssues.html (reporting on a study in the New EnglandJournalof Medicine).
467 PHRMA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2005 at 3 fig.l.2 (2005) (industry
funds research at almost twice the level of the National Institutes of Health).
468 Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers,ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2006, at 82-83 (studies in
medical literature indicate that doctors who take gifts from a drug company are more
likely to prescribe that company's drugs or ask that they be added to a hospital's formulary).469
Id. at 88.
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ity litigation system is a critical component to create incentives for
greater access to risk information to ensure the public's health. The
Supreme Court's implied conflict preemption doctrine as applied to
the FDA's prescription drug labeling regulations supports this conclusion and weighs state tort litigation strongly in the battle over implied
preemption.

